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MANIPULATION OF FUTURES MARKETS: 
REDEFINING THE OFFENSE 
WENDY COLLINS PERDUE* 
INTRODUCTION 
I N September 1984, a group of farmers collected in front of the Chi-cago Board of Trade ("CBOT") to protest low farm prices and to urge 
the criminalization of futures trading. 1 They argued that speculating in 
commodity futures was "manipulative and improper."2 This type of pro-
test is not unusuaJ.3 Futures markets have existed in this country for 
over 100 years,4 and, for as long as they have existed, have been the 
object of protest, suspicion and contempt. 5 Critics have condemned fu-
tures trading as nothing more than a form of legalized gambling,6 have 
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The author is 
grateful to Richard Diamond and Thomas Krattenmaker for their valuable suggestions 
and to Robert Wehner for his research assistance. 
1. See Washington Post, Sept 28, 1984, at D1, col. 2. 
2. Id. 
3. See C.B. Cowing, Populists, Plungers & Progressives: A Social History of Stock 
& Commodity Speculation 1890-1936, at 3-24 (1965); Wilmouth, Exchange Views of 
Speculation, in CBOT Seminar Report on Research on Speculation 5 (1980). 
4. The Chicago Board of Trade, the oldest futures exchange in the United States, 
began operations in 1848. See J. Baer & G. Woodruff, Commodity Exchanges 24 (1929); 
see generally Williams, The Origin of Futures Markets, Agric. Hist 306 (Jan. 1982) (dis-
cussing development of futures markets in the United States). 
5. SeeR. Teweles, C. Harlow & H. Stone, The Commodity Futures Game 11-14 
(1974) [hereinafter Futures Game]. 
6. See Review of Commodity Exchange Act and Discussion of Possible Changes: 
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1973) [herein-
after Review ofCEA Hearings] (comments of Rep. Rarick) (the speculator "may end up 
hurting both the producer and the consumer"); 62 Cong. Rec. 9411-12 (1922) (remarks 
of Rep. Williams) ("My opinion is that every transaction on a board of trade where the 
actual delivery of the grain is not contemplated is more or less a gambling transaction"; 
Chicago Grain Exchange is "the most colossal gambling institution in the world."); 61 
Cong. Rec. 4763 (1921) (remarks of Sen. Capper), quoted in Rainbolt, Regulating the 
Grain Gambler and His Successors, 6 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1977) ("[W]e are permitting 
the biggest gambling hell in the world to be operated on the Chicago Board of Trade."); 
T. Hieronymus, Economics of Futures Trading 137 (1971) [hereinafter T. Hieronymus, 
Economics] ("Commodity speculation has been said, many many, times, to be the 'big-
gest gamble of them all.'"); Irwin, Legal Status of Trading in Futures, 32 Ill. L Rev. 155, 
155 (1937-38) ("The time honored attitude has been that futures contracts are gambling 
contracts if, at the making of the agreements, the parties do not intend to make and 
receive delivery on the contracts."); Securities Week (McGraw Hill), May 26, 1980, at 5, 
6 (statement of Commodity Future Trading Commission ("CFTC") Chairman Stone that 
silver speculation "was akin to gambling"). 
Prior to federal involvement in the area, a number of states prohibited futures trading 
as a form of illegal gambling. See C.B. Cowing, supra note 3, at 27; H. Emery, Specula-
tion on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States 195-97 (1896). 
Professor Hieronymus points out two significant differences between commodities 
speculation and gambling: 
I. Gambling involves the creation of risks that would not otherwise exist 
345 
346 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
described traders as "'greedy men blinded by the lust for money, traf-
ficking in human misery,' "7 and have blamed traders for price fluctua-
tions and a host of other evils. 8 
Historically, one of the most common charges raised against the fu-
tures market has been that of market manipulation. It would seem that 
whenever the public perceives prices as being too high or too low, some-
one will allege that the price is the result of manipulation.9 The protes-
tors at the CBOT raised this allegation, 10 as did their great-grandfathers 
three generations earlier. 11 
Despite the ease and frequency with which critics have leveled the 
charge of manipulation and the fact that federal law has prohibited "ma-
nipulation" for over 65 years, 12 a satisfactory definition of manipulation 
while speculation involves the assumption of necessary and unavoidable risks of 
commerce, and 2. In every futures transaction, the speculator incurs the duties 
and acquires the rights of a holder of property and thus is an integral part of 
commerce. 
T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra, at 138; see also United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 
165 (7th Cir.) (discussing difference between speculation and gambling), cert. denied, 474 
u.s. 838 (1985). 
7. T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 4 (quoting 1947 statement of U.S. 
Attorney General); see 62 Cong. Rec. 9416 (1922) (remarks of Rep. Bland) ("I would 
misrepresent my agricultural constituents if I failed to do all in my power to strike down 
the gambler who would rob them of the fruit of their toil."); 61 Cong. Rec. 1368 (1921) 
(remarks of Rep. Hudspeth) (''These silk-gloved, gold-collared, and stiff-hat gentry, great 
benefactors of the horny-handed farmer . . . 'they toil not, neither do they spin,' but 
Solomon in all his glory never was arrayed like them."); Bianco, The Mechanics of Fu-
tures Trading: Speculation and Manipulation, 6 Hofstra L. Rev. 27, 31 (1977) (observing 
that the speculator frequently is viewed as a sinister character). These views may reflect 
in part an idea dating back to the middle ages that the middleman is an unproductive 
parasite who simply makes a profit on the labor of others. See C.B. Cowing, supra note 3, 
at 83 (N.Y. Tribune urges that all middlemen be conscripted); id. at 86-87 (food adminis-
trator praised for eliminating "useless" middlemen); A. Eddy, The Law of Combinations 
40 (1901); Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 35 Yale L.J. 
905, 910 (1926). As recently as 1973, Senator George McGovern expressed a similar 
view: "[E]very time a speculator turns an unreasonable profit by trading futures, the 
housewife and the consumer pay the price. And since it is the speculator, not the pro-
ducer, who receives the windfall profit, the higher wholesale and retail prices do not act 
as a stimulant to production." [1973] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) A-15. 
8. See, e.g., 61 Cong. Rec. 4763 (1921) (remarks of Sen. Capper) (suicide attributed 
to futures trading); id. (embezzlement of bank funds by bank president attributed tofu-
tures trading). 
9. See J. Baer & G. Woodruff, supra note 4, at 183; C.B. Cowing, supra note 3, at 5; 
Tomek, Speculation and Price Behavior on Commodity Markets: A Survey, in CBOT 
Seminar Report on Research on Speculation 8, 18-19 (Nov. 1980). 
10. See Washington Post, Sept. 28, 1984, at 01, col. 2. 
11. C.B. Cowing, supra note 3, at 5. 
12. See Future Trading Act, Pub. L. No. 67-66, § 5(d), 42 Stat. 187, 188 (1921) [here-
inafter Future Trading Act]; Grain Futures Act, Pub. L. No. 67-331, § 5(d), 42 Stat. 998, 
1000 (1922) [hereinafter Grain Futures Act]; Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-
675, § 9, 49 Stat. 1491, 1499-1500 (1936) [hereinafter CEA]. The current version of the 
manipulation prohibition provides: 
It shall be a felony punishable by a fine of not more than $500,000 or imprison-
ment for not more than five years, or both, together with the costs of prosecu-
tion, for any person to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any 
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has yet to emerge. 13 Although courts14 and commentators15 have tried 
to define the term, this Article argues that none of their definitions is 
satisfactory. 
Most of the definitions of manipulation offered by courts and commen-
tators share a common element: they focus on whether the resulting 
price is "artificial."16 Accordingly, a typical definition of manipulation is 
" 'the creation of an artificial price by planned action, whether by one 
man or a group of men.' " 17 Courts and commentators repeatedly have 
used this definition and variations of it. 18 
While this definition is short and apparently straightforward, the core 
of the definition remains a particularly elusive concept-that of "an arti-
ficial price." Artificial price, of course, could mean simply a manipulated 
price, in which case the typical definition of manipulation would be a 
tautology. 19 But the notion of manipulation as the creation of an artifi-
cial price has not been treated as a mere tautology. Rather, cases20 and 
commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the 
rules of any contract market, or to comer or attempt to comer any such com-
modity, or knowingly to deliver or cause to be delivered for transmission 
through the mails or in interstate commerce by telegraph, telephone, wireless. 
or other means of communication false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate 
reports concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend 
to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce .... 
7 u.s.c. § 13b (1982). 
13. See 1 T. Russo, Regulation of the Commodities Futures and Options Markets 
§ 12.01, at 12-5 (1983). 
14. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cerr. denied, 406 
U.S. 932 (1972); Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962); cases cited infra 
note 118. 
15. See, e.g., McDermott, Defining Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: 
The Futures "Squeeze," 74 Nw. U.L. Rev. 202 (1979); Van Smith, Pre~·enting the Manip-
ulation of Commodity Futures Markets: To Deliver or Not to De/i~·er, 32 Hastings LJ. 
1569 (1981); sources cited infra note 119. 
16. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1167-70 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 
U.S. 932 (1972); accord Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 58 (5th Cir. 1962); Great 
W. Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 482 (7th Cir.), cerr. denied, 345 U.S. 
997 (1953); General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220,231 (7th Cir. 1948); T. Hier-
onymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 144-45; Gray, Economic Evidence in Manipulation 
Cases, in CBOT Seminar Report on Research on Speculation 108, 109 (Nov. 1980); John-
son, Commodity Market Manipulation, 38 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 725, 730 (1981) [herein-
after Johnson I]. 
17. General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220, 231 (7th Cir. 1948) (quoting 
government's brief). 
18. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
406 U.S. 932 (1972); Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1]21,796, at 27,281, 27,283 (CFTC 1982); Hohenberg Bros., 
[1975-77 Transfer Bir:der] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1120,271, at 21,477 (CFTC 1977); 
1 T. Russo, supra note 13, § 12.10, at 12-17; Bianco, supra note 7, at 35; Irwin, The 
Nature of Risk Assumption in the Trading on Organized Exchanges, 37 Am. Econ. Rev. 
267, 268 (1937); see generally 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, §§ 12.9 & 12.10, at 12-13 to 12-
18 (describing some of the different formulations). 
19. See Van Smith, supra note 15, at 1579-80. 
20. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 
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commentators21 generally have treated the concept of an artificial price 
as if it had some ascertainable content. Despite numerous attempts to 
define and then apply the concept of an artificial price, none has proven 
satisfactory. All suffer from serious defects22 that make the concept of 
artificial price either inappropriate to, or unhelpful in, the determination 
of what constitutes manipulation. Defining manipulation as the creation 
of an artificial price simply substitutes one unhelpful term for another. 
Over the last few years, however, there has been a growing recognition 
of the inadequacy of the traditional artificial price approach to manipula-
tion. 23 A few commentators have offered alternative definitions that do 
not focus on the existence of an artificial price. 24 Although these defini-
tions prove inadequate for other reasons, 25 they represent a step in the 
right direction. 
This Article offers a fresh approach to defining manipulation. Rather 
than asking a court to determine whether a price is "artificial" or "unrea-
sonable," the proposed definition focuses on whether the conduct of the 
people involved is reasonable. More precisely, this Article defines manip-
ulation as conduct that would be uneconomical or irrational, absent an 
effect on market price. 26 
Part I of this Article briefly describes by way of background the opera-
tion and purpose of the commodity futures market, and Part II analyzes 
the legislative history of federal commodity trading laws. Part III de-
scribes and analyzes past approaches to defining manipulation that have 
proven inadequate. Part IV first critiques the various views regarding the 
purpose underlying the manipulation prohibition and then introduces an 
alternative view. Based on this view, this Article then proposes a defini-
tion of manipulation that focuses on the trader's conduct rather than on 
the resulting price and demonstrates how this definition can be used to 
identify common types of manipulation. The Article concludes that this 
new definition will prove more workable and thus will lead to more accu-
rate identification of manipulative conduct in the commodity futures 
market than is possible using currently accepted definitions. 
I. THE OPERATION AND PURPOSE OF THE FUTURES MARKET 
Before delving into the concept of manipulation, it is useful to describe 
briefly the operation and purposes of futures markets. A futures contract 
U.S. 932 (1972); Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962); Cox, [1986-87 
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 23,786, at 34,064-66 (CFTC 1987). 
21. See, e.g., 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, § 12.24; Johnson I, supra note 16, at 746-54. 
22. See infra notes 129-214 and accompanying text. 
23. See, e.g., 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, § 12.29, at 12-51 to 12-52; McDermott, supra 
note 15, at 212; Van Smith, supra note 15, at 1579-81. 
24. See Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures Mar-
kets, 59 J. Bus. Sl03 (1986); McDermott, supra note 15; Van Smith, supra note 15. For a 
description and analysis of these approaches, see infra notes 216-72. 
25. See infra notes 216-72 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 295-320 and accompanying text. 
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is a contract for the future sale or purchase of a specified commodity?' 
The trading takes place on designated exchanges28 using standardized 
contracts, that, among other things, specify a delivery date and particular 
quality requirements for delivery.29 By the time the contracts expire, all 
traders must have "settled," either by making an equal and opposite off-
setting transaction30 or by delivery. Delivery may involve an actual 
transfer of ownership in the underlying product.31 This generally is the 
case with traditional commodities such as agricultural goods. On the 
other hand, some markets, particularly the more recently developed mar-
kets such as stock index futures, use a cash delivery system.32 Under this 
system, the short33 does not transfer actual ownership but transfers the 
cash value, as of the settlement date, of the underlying product. 34 The 
delivery mechanism, whether it is a cash system or physical delivery, 
insures that futures prices and "cash" or "spot" prices3s for the actual 
commodity converge. 36 
Futures markets serve several important economic functions. 37 First, 
the market summarizes and communicates information. A futures price, 
in essence, consists of a weighted average of the disparate information 
and expectations of all traders. 38 Second, the price generated by the fu-
27. For a general discussion of the nature and operation of futures contracts, see T. 
Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 28-44; Futures Game, supra note 5, at 22-28. 
28. It is unlawful to trade futures except through a board of trade that has been 
designated by the CFfC as a contract market See 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1982). 
29. See T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 40-41. 
30. See id. at 41-47. Thus, a trader who held 100 long contracts could settle by sell-
ing 100 contracts of the same commodity and delivery month. 
31. See T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 41; Futures Game, supra note 5, 
at 61. Only a small percentage of futures contracts are settled by actual delivery. See 
H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1974) [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 975] 
(noting that about three percent of futures contracts are settled by delivery). 
32. See Markham & Gilberg, Washington Watch, 6 Corp. L. Rev. 59, 60 (1983). 
33. A "short" contract is a commitment to deliver the commodity in the future. See 
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Merrill Lynch, Pierce. 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). A "long" contract is a commit-
ment to accept delivery of the commodity in the future. See id. 
34. See Hobson, Cash Settlement of Futures Contracts: Concepts and Experience, 1 
Educ. Q. (CFfC) 1 (Nov. 1982). 
35. The "cash" or "spot" price is the price for a specified lot for immediate delivery. 
See S. Kroll & I. Shishko, The Commodity Futures Market Guide 17 (1973). For a 
discussion of the difference between cash and futures markets, see id. at 67. See generally 
T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 31-33 (details regarding trading processes). 
36. See T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 151-52; infra notes 250-52 and 
accompanying text 
37. See H.R. Rep. No. 975, supra note 31, at 132-33; T. Hieronymus, Economics, 
supra note 6, at 99-102, 106-08; Edwards, The Regulation of Futures Markets: A Concep-
tual Framework 19-21 (Center for the Study of Futures Markets, Working Paper Series 
#CSFM-23 1981). 
38. See Arrow, Futures Markets: Some Theoretical Perspectil'es, 1 J. Fut. Mkts. 107, 
114 (1981); Carlton, Futures Markets: Their Purpose. Their History, Their Growth, Their 
Successes and Failures 12 (Center for the Study of Futures Markets, Working Paper Se-
ries #CSFM-78 1984); Cox, Futures Trading and Market Information, 84 J. Pol. Econ. 
1215, 1216-18 (1976); Working, Economic Functions of Futures Markets, in Selected 
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tures market itself provides an extremely valuable piece of information. 39 
Because a futures market creates a homogeneous good traded under stan-
dardized terms, futures prices more accurately reflect current commodi-
ties' values than do individually negotiated spot transactions by any 
particular buyer and seller.40 Futures prices can be disseminated widely 
and cheaply,41 even to nontraders. Such knowledge facilitates efficient 
resource allocation. 42 
Third, the futures market permits "hedging." Hedging is a practice by 
which a trader with a position in the cash market purchases an offsetting 
futures position and thereby reduces the risks associated with price varia-
tions. 43 This risk reduction method reduces the cost of holding 
inventory.44 
Writings of Holbrook Working 297 (A. Pecked. 1977) [hereinafter Working I]; see gener-
ally Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286-88 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing the operation and 
function of futures markets), ajf'd sub nom. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 
v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). 
39. See Arrow, supra note 38, at 115; Cox, supra note 38, at 1216; Telser & 
Higinbotham, Organized Futures Markets: Costs and Benefits, 85 J. Pol. Econ. 969, 997 
(1977). 
40. See Telser & Higinbotham, supra note 39, at 973-74. 
41. See T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 101-02; Cox, supra note 38, at 
1218. In one survey, 50% offarmers reported that their forward contracts were "based" 
on futures prices. See Carlton, supra note 38, at 35 n.27. 
42. See Cox, supra note 38, at 1216, 1235; Edwards, supra note 37, at 19-20; Peck, 
The Economic Role of Traditional Commodity Futures Markets, in Futures Markets: 
Their Economic Role 40 (A. Pecked. 1985); Tomek, supra note 9, at 14-15; Working, 
Futures Trading and Hedging, 43 Am. Econ. Rev. 314, 326-27 (1953) [hereinafter Work-
ing II]; Working, Hedging Reconsidered, in Selected Writings of Holbrook Working 133 
(A. Pecked. 1977); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 
U.S. 353, 390 (1982) ("Federal regulation of futures trading benefits the entire economy; 
a sound futures market tends to reduce retail prices of the underlying commodities."). 
43. One writer defines a hedge as "[a] commitment in the futures market which is 
established to offset a cash commodity position." S. Angrist, Sensible Speculating in 
Commodities 201 (1972); see T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 148-49; 1 P. 
Johnson, Commodities Regulation§ 1.12, at 38-44 (1982); Futures Game, supra note 5, 
at 32-43. 
44. See H.R. Rep. No. 975, supra note 31, at 131; T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra 
note 6, at 148-49. The economics of hedging has been the source of some controversy. 
The traditional view of hedging envisions that those who either hold or need inventory of 
a particular commodity will take an equal and opposite futures market position. See, e.g., 
H.R. Rep. No. 975, supra note 31, at 131; J. Baer & 0. Saxon, Commodity Exchanges & 
Futures Trading 203-04 (1949). The theory asserts that any change in the cash or spot 
price usually will be offset by an equal change in the futures price, thus eliminating the 
risks associated with price variance. , 
Although this view of hedging has been widely described and relied upon, see, e.g., 
H.R. Rep. No. 975, supra note 31, at 131; Ederington, The Hedging Performance of the 
New Futures Markets, 34 J. of Fin. 157, 159-60 (1979) (cited sources), economists have 
discredited it because its fundamental assumption that changes in spot prices tend to be 
offset by equal changes in futures prices is incorrect. See Working II, supra note 42, at 
325-26; see also T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 148; Kamara, Issues in Fu-
tures Markets: A Survey 5 (Center for the Study of Futures Markets, Working Paper 
Series #CSFM-30 1982). Professor Holbrook Working, in his seminal article, Futures 
Trading and Hedging, argued, contrary to the traditional view, that "[m]ost hedging is 
done in the expectation of a change in spot-future price relations." Working II, supra 
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Despite the animosity often directed toward the futures market and 
the widely held belief that those markets are prone to excessive and de-
stabilizing manipulation,45 the economic studies agree overwhelmingly 
that futures trading tends to stabilize prices.46 Given this stabilizing ef-
note 42, at 325. According to Working, hedging represents not the opposite of specula-
tion but simply another type of speculation. See id. Instead of speculating in price level 
fluctuations, the hedger speculates in price relationship fluctuations. See T. Hieronymus, 
Economics, supra note 6, at 149; Kamara, supra, at 5; Working II, supra note 42, at 325-
26. Thus, hedging may be understood, not as a means of eliminating all risk. but as a 
process by which one "insulate[s] one's business activities from price level speculation 
while retaining the opportunity to speculate [on changes between cash and futures 
prices]." T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 149. 
Some economists have begun to use portfolio theory to analyze hedging behavior. See. 
e.g., Ederington, supra, at 161-62; Johnson, The Theory of Hedging and Speculation in 
Commodity Futures, 27 Rev. Econ. Stud. 139, 142-45 (1960) [hereinafter Johnson II]. 
This approach treats hedging as a mechanism for "risk management" rather than "risk 
transferral." Futures Game, supra note 5, at 42. As in Working's analysis of hedging, 
portfolio analysis suggests that "parallelism of actual price movements [between cash and 
futures prices] is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a perfectly effective 
hedge." Kamara, supra, at 2; see Johnson II, supra, at 144. 
45. See. e.g., CEA, supra note 12, §§ 3, 4a(1); see also infra note 66. 
46. See. e.g., Gray, Onions Revisited, reprinted in II Selected Writings on Futures 
Markets 328 (A. Pecked. 1977); Powers, Does Futures Trading Reduce Price Fluctuations 
in Cash Markets?, 60 Am. Econ. Rev. 460, 462 (1970); Working II, supra note 42, at 327-
32. 
One is left wondering why, if futures markets perform such useful functions, they are 
so widely despised and distrusted. Although a complete answer to this question lies be-
yond the scope of this Article, a few observations will be offered. For one, people un-
doubtedly tend to distrust that which they do not understand, and futures trading seems 
to be particularly poorly understood. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. Fur-
thermore, the futures market offers a convenient target for those who are harmed by the 
prevailing price level of commodities. Ignorance and the need for scapegoats may not, 
however, provide the complete answer. 
In addition, some may dislike futures markets for the very reason that they provide 
well-publicized information and reduce risks. See Gray & Rutledge, The Economics of 
Commodity Futures Markets: A Survey, 34 Rev. of Mktg. & Agric. Econ. 57, 61 (1971). 
Baer and Saxon recount an incident in which a survey was taken of producers, merchants 
and manufacturers as to whether they favored creation of a new futures market in a 
particular commodity. One merchant explained his opposition as follows: 
"I have many buyers traveling throughout the producing areas to purchase di-
rectly from the growers. They pay cash. When they go to a grower and offer 
him a definite price per pound in spot cash, the grower is tempted to sell with-
out investigating prevailing prices. He often does so. But, if there were an ex-
change in existence, its prices would be telegraphed all over the country and 
would appear in every newspaper of any size and circulation. The seller would 
know just how closely the price he was offered approached the prevailing mar-
ket price. Our buyers work to purchase the commodity under the prevailing 
market, and they make excellent purchases below the market. If the exchange 
were established, I would probably have to pay current market prices for all I 
buy." 
J. Baer & 0. Saxon, supra note 44, at 101. 
Similarly, a dominant producer might wish to eliminate the futures market because its 
presence reduces the risk (and hence the costs) to the producer's fringe competitors. By 
eliminating the futures market and thereby increasing the risk of fringe producers, the 
dominant producer increases its profits by reducing the supply. See Newberry, The Ma-
nipulation of Futures Markets by a Dominant Producer, in The Industrial Organization of 
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feet and the other important functions served by futures markets, any 
regulatory scheme designed to curtail abuses must be carefully tailored 
so as not to undermine the usefulness of those markets. 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL REGULATION 
Any attempt to determine the meaning of "manipulation" based on 
congressional intent is certain to be a difficult undertaking. Congress has 
regulated or attempted to regulate the futures industry for over 100 
years. 47 There have been hundreds of bills and congressional hearings on 
the subject, 48 including a number of proposals to prohibit futures trading 
completely.49 Furthermore, the overwhelming ignorance and confusion 
exhibited by Congress toward the futures industry further complicates 
analysis of the legislative history. Even modem Congresses have admit-
ted that they find the topic of futures trading to be "esoteric."5° Former 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman William Bagley was 
even more blunt: "When I go before Congress, I spend four-fifths of my 
time just explaining the futures market."51 
A. Legislation and Debates 
Whatever confusion Congress may have experienced regarding futures 
trading and its economic function, Congress consistently has condemned 
manipulation. The first comprehensive federal regulation of futures trad-
ing, the Future Trading Act of 1921,52 authorized the Secretary of Agri-
culture to order a board of trade to suspend the trading privileges of 
anyone "attempting to manipulate the market price of any grain."53 
Futures Markets 43 (R. Anderson ed. 1984). Thus, some may dislike futures markets for 
the very reason that futures markets decrease price fluctuations and promote national 
pricing. 
47. See Note, Prevention of Commodity Futures Manipulation Under the Commodity 
Exchange Act, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1373, 1374 n.4 (1941); see also supra text accompanying 
note 12. 
48. See Note, supra note 47, at 1374 n.4; Note, Federal Regulation of Commodity 
Futures Trading, 60 Yale L.J. 822, 832 n.46 (1951). 
49. See, e.g., S. 1093, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928); S. 454, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1926); J. Baer & G. Woodruff, supra note 4, at 183-84; C.B. Cowing, supra note 3, at 43. 
50. H.R. Rep. No. 975, supra note 31, at 1. 
51. Editorial Commentary, Futures Image and the Conception of an Association, 
Commodities 14, 14 (April 1977). The problem of ignorance may not be confined to 
Congress. William Bagley, the first Chairman of the CFTC, also was quoted after his 
appointment as saying, "I have the luxury of being unfettered by knowledge of, or ac-
quaintance with, the industry." Bosley, The Assault on the Futures Industry, Commodi-
ties 42, 44 (Nov. 1977) (citing Wall Street J., Aug. 13, 1976). 
52. Ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921). 
53. Future Trading Act, supra note 12, § 6(b); see also Grain Futures Act, supra note 
12, § 5(d). Congress intended both the Future Trading Act and the Grain Futures Act to 
limit futures trading to designated boards of trade approved by the secretary of agricul-
ture. To be approved, a board had to, among other things, "provideD for the prevention 
of manipulation of prices, or the cornering of any grain, by the dealers or operators upon 
such board." Future Trading Act, supra note 12, § 5(d); see also Grain Futures Act, 
supra note 12, § 5(d). 
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A year after its enactment, the Supreme Court declared the Futures 
Trading Act an unconstitutional exercise of congressional taxing author-
ity.54 A hasty rewrite produced the Grain Futures Act, which withstood 
constitutional scrutiny. 55 The substantive provisions of the Grain Fu-
tures Act are identical to those of the Futures Trading Act.s6 In 1936, 
Congress renamed the statute the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA"), s7 
enlarged the scope of the Act's coverage, 58 and, for the first time, made it 
a criminal violation for any person to "manipulate or attempt to manipu-
late the price of any commodity in interstate commerce ... or who shall 
comer or attempt to comer any such commodity."s9 This prohibition 
against manipulation remains intact today.60 
Since 1936, Congress has continued to condemn manipulation. It has 
increased substantially the penalties for manipulation61 and, in 197462 
and 1982,63 it carefully reexamined the CEA. Despite this activity, Con-
gress, since 1936, has paid little attention to defining manipulation. The 
bulk of the legislative history on the meaning of manipulation, therefore, 
is found prior to 1936.64 
54. See Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66-68 (1922). 
55. See Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923). 
56. The rewrite simply made it clear that Congress was relying on the commerce 
clause, rather than on its taxing authority, for its power to regulate the futures market. 
See infra note 66. 
57. CEA, supra note 12, § 1. 
58. The Future Trading Act and the Grain Futures Act applied only to transactions 
involving grain. See Future Trading Act, supra note 12, § 2; Grain Futures Act, supra 
note 12, § 2. The CEA applies to a much broader range of commodities. See CEA, supra 
note 12, § 2(a). 
59. CEA, supra note 12, § 9. The CEA consisted largely of additions to, rather than 
revisions of, the Grain Futures Act. For a description of those major additions, see Leist 
v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 294-95 (2d Cir. 1980), a.ff'd sub nom. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). 
60. 7 u.s.c. § 13{b) (1982). 
61. See infra note 64. 
62. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-463, 
88 Stat. 1389; H.R. Rep. No. 975, supra note 31; S. Rep. No. 1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1974). 
63. See Future Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294; H.R. Rep. 
No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. Rep. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 
64. Ironically, the Congress devoting the most time to discussing what manipulation 
involved ultimately decided that the term was too vague to make criminalization appro-
priate. As Senator Norris, then chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, stated in 
explaining why Congress did not make manipulation a crime under the Future Trading 
Act: "[T]hese things are various and perhaps impossible of direct definition. I do not 
know how we would draw a definition to bring it home to the individual." Future Trad-
ing in Grain: Hearings on H.R. 5676 Before the Senate Ccmm. on Agriculture and For-
estry, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1921) [hereinafter 1921 Senate Hearings] (statement of 
Chairman Norris). Later Congresses ignored Senator Norris' concern and simply con-
verted manipulation first, in 1936, into a misdemeanor, see CEA, supra note 12, § 9, and 
later, in 1968, into a felony, see Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 90-258 § 25, 82 
Stat. 26, 33 (1968), without any analysis as to the meaning of manipulation. 
Congressional documents offer little explanation for the change from misdemeanor to 
felony other than this statement by the administrator of CEA: "No violations are now 
classified as felonies under the act. It is our feeling that the serious ones such as price 
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During the 1920's and early 1930's, the hearings and debates concern-
ing futures trading include frequent references to manipulation, 65 yet 
they provide little consensus as to the term's meaning. 66 At times it 
manipulation, such as the willful dissemination of false market information, and such as 
embezzlement are the types of violations that should be felonies." Amend the Commodity 
Exchange Act: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
64-65 (1967); see H.R. Rep. No. 743, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1967). This 1968 amend· 
ment was curious because although manipulation had been prosecutable as a crime since 
1936, very few criminal prosecutions seem to have occurred. The author has found refer-
ence to only one criminal prosecution prior to this amendment. See Comment, Manipu-
lation of Commodity Futures Prices-The Great Western Case, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 94, 112 
n.93 (1953). There is no evidence in the legislative history showing that criminal manipu-
lators were getting off with light misdemeanor sentences. Congress may have hoped that 
the increased penalty would increase the in terrorem effect without the need for enforce-
ment. See S. Rep. No. 947, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968). Whatever the reasons for 
increasing the penalties, Congress gave no consideration to the meaning of manipulation. 
In 1974, the CEA underwent major revisions, one of which provided for the creation of 
a new, separate agency, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), to 
monitor and regulate futures trading. Despite the breadth of these revisions, the legisla-
tive history concerning the 1974 Act and subsequent reauthorizations of the CFTC con-
tain almost no analysis of the meaning or scope of the anti-manipulation provision. Prior 
to the House hearings on the 1974 Act, the House Agriculture Committee circulated to 
interested parties a list of twenty-five topics involving the CEA that the Committee would 
consider. See Review of CEA Hearings, supra note 6, at 24-29. None of the topics, how-
ever, had anything to do with manipulation or cornering. See id. at 24-29. Congress 
reauthorized the CFTC in 1978, see Future Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 
Stat. 865, and again in 1982, see Future Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 
2294. Manipulation was not considered in connection with either of these reauthoriza-
tions. For reviews of the 1978 and 1982legislation, see Rosen, The Impact of the Futures 
Trading Act of 1982 on Commodity Regulation, 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 142 (Jan. 
14, 1983), and Schneider & Santo, Commodity Futures Trading Commission: A Review of 
the 1978 Legislation, 34 Bus. Law. 1755 (1979). 
65. See, e.g., 1921 Senate Hearings, supra note 64, at 22, 197, 205, 293, 315, 334-35, 
452; Future Trading: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 66th Cong., 3d 
Sess. 320, 355-56, 376 (Jan.-Feb. 1921) [hereinafter Jan. 1921 House Hearings]; 61 Cong. 
Rec. 1315, 1318, 1323, 4762, 4765 (1921). 
66. It has been suggested that Congress was preoccupied with the problem of manipu-
lation. See Harrington, Culpability and Its Content Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 
17 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1984) [hereinafter Harrington I]. This may overstate the case, 
for although Congress discussed manipulation, it spent as much, if not more, time on 
other issues such as discriminatory treatment of farmer's cooperatives by the boards of 
trade. See, e.g., 62 Cong. Rec. 9430 (1922); Virtue, Legislation for the Farmers: Packers 
and Grain Exchanges, 37 Q.J. Econ. 687, 702 (1923). In fact, it was concern about the 
unfair treatment of farmer's cooperatives that motivated the constitutional attack on the 
Future Trading Act. See Stassen, Propaganda as Positive Law: Section 3 of the Commod-
ity Exchange Act, 58 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 635, 642 n.32 (1982). 
Moreover, the authority cited for the proposition that Congress was preoccupied with 
manipulation, see CEA, supra note 12, § 3; see, e.g., Harrington I, supra, at 7, may pro-
vide questionable support. Section 3 asserts that regulation in the area is necessary be-
cause "sudden or unreasonable fluctuations in [commodity prices] frequently occur as a 
result of such speculation, manipulation, or control." This section must be approached 
with some caution in light of its origin. Congress added § 3 to the Future Trading Act in 
1922 in order to meet United States Supreme Court objections to the constitutionality of 
the Act. See Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66-68 (1922). In striking down the Act as an 
unconstitutional exercise of congressional taxing authority, the Supreme Court dropped a 
broad hint that it would be far more receptive to regulation in this area as an exercise of 
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seems to have been used as a shorthand term to describe any conduct 
thought to be undesirable,67 or unpatriotically greedy.68 Much of the 
discussion during the 1921 hearings and debates focused on distinguish-
ing between speculators and manipulators or among speculators, gam-
blers, and manipulators.69 Clearly, many congressmen were uncertain 
congressional interstate commerce power. See id. at 68-69. Congress took the hint and 
hastily removed the tax provisions from the Act, substituting in their stead "legislative 
findings" that speculation and manipulation were having a serious detrimental impact on 
interstate commerce. See Grain Futures Act, supra note 12, § 3. 
The Agriculture Department, which had drafted the language for § 3, candidly admit-
ted that the sole purpose for including the manipulation language was to permit the Act 
to survive constitutional attack. See Grain Futures Act: Hearings Before the House 
Comm. on Agriculture, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 12-13 (1922) [hereinafter 1922 Grain Fu-
tures Hearings] (testimony of Chester Morrill, Assistant Secy. of Agriculture); 62 Cong. 
Rec. 9419 (1922). The House committee report on§ 3 is somewhat less candid. It boldly 
asserts that circumstances warrant the "finding" in § 3, adding: "[i]t is not the purpose 
to quote testimony in this report, but there are volumes of testimony given by the promi-
nent men of the Nation which uphold the committee in its conclusion." H.R. Rep. No. 
1095, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1922). It is probably wise that the committee chose not to 
quote the supposed supporting testimony because the hearings contained little support for 
the conclusion that manipulation occurred "frequently." See Stassen, supra, at 644. 
Nearly 60 years after the enactment of § 3, an altered jurisprudence of the commerce 
clause, compare J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, J.N. Young, Constitutional Law § 4.5 (3d ed. 
1986) (summarizing Court's approach to commerce clause from 1888-1936) with id., 
§ 4.8 (summarizing current commerce clause doctrine), has permitted Congress quietly to 
amend § 3 to eliminate the statement that excessive speculation, manipulation and con-
trol are "frequent" phenomena. In 1982, Congress amended § 3 to eliminate the finding 
that sudden or unreasonable fluctuations in price frequently occur as a result of specula-
tion, manipulation and control. See Future Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-444, 
§ 203, 96 Stat. 2294 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1982)). For a fuller discussion of the 
history of § 3, see Stassen, supra. 
67. See Cotton Prices: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Agricul-
ture and Forestry, Pursuant to S. Res. 142, 10th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1928) [hereinafter 
1928 Senate Cotton Hearings] (it is manipulation to "create disaster to cotton merchants 
and to the producer''). As one well-known futures trader observed in response to a Sena-
tor's question about manipulation: "The word 'manipulation' ... in its use is so broad as 
to include any operation of the cotton market that does not suit the gentleman who is 
speaking at the moment." I d. at 154 (statement of William Clayton). 
68. See C.B. Cowing, supra note 3, at 200 (quoting 1931 statement of Pres. Hoover); 
T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 4 (quoting 1947 statement of U.S. Attorney 
General). The looseness with which the term was used is illustrated by an incident in 
1928. President Hoover had appealed to certain traders to stop their short selling of 
wheat-conduct that Hoover characterized as "manipulationO." Commodity Short Sell-
ing: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 182 (1932) 
[hereinafter 1932 Short Selling Hearings]. Despite the President's characterization of the 
conduct, the chief of the Grain Futures Administration made it quite clear that he did 
not view the conduct in question as manipulation within the meaning of the Grain Fu-
tures Act, Pub. L. No. 67-331, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922), the federal statute in effect at 
that time. Rather, he understood the President's comment as referring to manipulation 
in "a general way." 1932 Short Selling Heanngs, supra, at 218. Throughout the legisla-
tive history, it is often difficult to ascertain whether references to manipulation are being 
used in this "general way," or as a more technical description of what the Act prohibits 
or should prohibit. 
69. A speculator is "[o]ne who voluntarily accepts the risks associated with the own-
ership of a commodity and relies on a price change in the commodity to produce a profit, 
or risk premium, for his efforts." S. Angrist, supra note 43, at 205. It is speculators who 
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about these distinctions, as witness after witness was asked to give his 
view of the distinction. 70 Even the most enlightened congressmen appear 
to have believed, incorrectly, that while not all speculators are manipula-
tors, all manipulators are speculators.71 
In addition to attempting to distinguish among speculators, manipula-
tors, and gamblers, much of the discussion about manipulation centered 
on large-scale transactions. Many congressmen appeared to view large-
scale trading as the primary, if not the sole, method of manipulation.72 
The classic problem that seemed to trouble Congress was a scheme by 
which an individual who ultimately wanted to buy a large quantity of a 
assume the risks that hedgers seek to transfer. See Bianco, supra note 7, at 32. Specula-
tors are essential to the functioning of a futures market. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 390 (1982); T. Hieronymous, Economics, 
supra note 6, at 140. For a discussion of congressional recognition of the essential role of 
speculators, see Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 305-07 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). "A com-
modity futures market without speculation would be a thing of death; it would not 
amount to anything. It would serve no economic utility." Onions: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Domestic Marketing of the House Comm. on Agriculture on H.R. 376, H.R. 
1933, H.R. 1935, H.R. 3418, H.R. 5236 and H.R. 5732, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1957) 
(statement of Roger R. Kauffman, Administrator, Commodities Exchange Commission). 
Although futures speculation frequently is equated with gambling, there are significant 
differences between the two. See T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 137-38; see 
also supra note 6. 
70. See, e.g., Future Trading: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture on 
H.R. 168, H.R. 231, H.R. 2238, H.R. 2331, H.R. 2363 and H.R. 5228, 67th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 155 (Apr.-May 1921) [hereinafter April 1921 House Hearings]; Jan. 1921 House 
Hearings, supra note 65, at 355-56, 376, 385, 591, 812; 61 Cong. Rec. 1318, 1319, 1323 
(1921). One representative described a manipulator as one "who never owned a bushel of 
wheat in his life, who just simply figures on futures." April1921 House Hearings, supra, 
at 133. The witness to whom the representative was speaking attempted to explain that 
the congressman had described a speculator, not a manipulator, but the representative 
remained unmoved. See April1921 House Hearings, supra, at 133; see also Cotton and 
Grain Futures Act.' Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 71st. 
Cong., 3d Sess. 68 (Feb. 1931) [hereinafter 1931 Senate Cotton and Grain Hearings]; 1928 
Senate Cotton Hearings, supra note 67, at 35. 
71. See, e.g., Jan. 1921 House Hearings, supra note 65, at 385, 591; 61 Cong. Rec. 
1318 (1921). This conclusion demonstrates substantial confusion about the notion of 
speculation, if not about manipulation. Modern history has demonstrated that hedgers 
are at least as capable of manipulation as are speculators. See 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, 
at 12-9 n.5. The 1976 Maine potato scandal, described by one commentator as "perhaps 
the largest manipulation ever attempted through a contract market," involved hedgers 
but virtually no speculators. See Bianco, supra note 7, at 37 n.57. 
72. SeeS. Rep. No. 1431, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935); S. Doc. No. 123, 71st Cong., 
2d Sess. 7 (1930); To Amend the Grain Futures Act: Hearing on H.R. 6772 Before the 
Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 209 (1936) [hereinafter 
1936 GFA Hearings]; Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: Hearing on H.R. 3009 Before 
the House Comm. on Agriculture, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1935); 1932 Short Selling 
Hearings, supra note 68, at 201; 1931 Senate Cotton and Grain Hearings, supra note 70, at 
48; Supervision of Cotton Futures Exchanges: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Agri-
culture and Forestry, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1928) [hereinafter 1928 Cotton Futures 
Hearings]; 1921 Senate Hearings, supra note 64, at 19 (remarks of Sen. Goodling); Jan. 
1921 House Hearings, supra note 65, at 328, 350, 896, 911; 78 Cong. Rec. 10446 (1934); 
61 Cong. Rec. 5559 (1921). 
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commodity would first sell large quantities short in order to drive the 
price down and then buy his needs at the new low price. 73 
This concern about large-scale transactions is apparent in several early 
versions of the Grain Futures Act that provided for limitations on the 
permissible size of speculative positions. 74 Such provisions were to be 
included in the same section of the act that prohibited manipulation.75 
The provision concerning position limitations occasionally even was re-
ferred to as a "definition" of manipulation.76 Nonetheless, the Senate 
rejected a 1921 House proposal to include a provision about position lim-
its in the section dealing with manipulation. 77 
B. Grain Futures Administration Position 
While the above-described comments and concerns do not seem to re-
flect a coherent and articulable theory of the meaning of manipulation, a 
relatively coherent theory does emerge from the views expressed to Con-
gress by the Grain Futures Administration ("GFA"), the branch of the 
Department of Agriculture responsible for enforcing the Grain Futures 
Act. 78 Between the enactment of the Grain Futures Act and the CEA. 
the GF A repeatedly expressed to Congress its understanding of manipu-
lation.79 The GFA position focused unequivocally on the conduct and 
73. It is unlikely that such a scheme would prove effective unless the trader's activi-
ties or accompanying false rumors also induced others to sell or go short; otherwise. the 
trader would depress the price with his large-scale trades and then increase the price 
again as soon as he started buying. See 1931 Senate Cotton and Grain Hearings, supra 
note 70, at 68; 1921 Senate Hearings, supra note 64, at 154; H. Emery, supra note 6, at 
172-73. This scenario is sometimes referred to as the problem of "burying the corpse." 
See Note, The Delivery Requirement: An Illusory Bar to Regulation of Manipulation in 
Commodity Exchanges, 13 Yale L.J. 171, 185 n.79 (1963); Comment, supra note 64, at 
100 n.38. 
74. See April1921 House Hearings, supra note 70, at 13 (statement of Rep. Tmcher) 
(discussing 200,000 bushel limit on single future trades); 1921 Senate Hearings, supra 
note 64, at 378 (discussing 500,000 bushel limit on single future trades); see also 1932 
Short Selling Hearings, supra note 68, at 200-10. 
75. Grain Futures: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry on 
H.R. 11843, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1922) [hereinafter 1922 Senate Hearings] (statement 
of Rep. McNary); 61 Cong. Rec. 5559 (1921) (statement of Rep. Kelly). 
76. 1922 Senate Hearings, supra note 75, at 13; see also 61 Cong. Rec. 5559 (1921). 
77. See 61 Cong. Rec. 5030 (1921). This limitation-as-"prophylactic" interpretation 
conforms with the rejection in 1921 of a proposed amendment to the bill that ultimately 
became the Grain Futures Act. The Senate had modified the section in the House version 
of the Act relating to the prevention of manipulation so as to require the boards of trade 
to prevent "undue or unfair manipulation." The House subsequently rejected these mod-
ifying words and the Senate acceded. See id. This rejection of the Senate modification, 
combined with the position of the Grain Futures Administration, suggests that Congress 
did not accept the view that all activity affecting price is manipulation and that all that 
distinguishes legal from illegal manipulation is the extent of that price effect. It further 
suggests that Congress felt neither the fact of a price effect nor the extent of that effect 
determines whether conduct qualifies as manipulation. 
78. See G. Hoffman, Future Trading Upon Organized Commodity Markets in the 
United States 372 (1932). 
79. See infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text. The GFA's position possesses par-
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intent of traders, not on resulting prices. The basic position of the GFA 
was that to engage in trades that affect price does not constitute manipu-
lation, even if that effect is dramatic or if the trader knows that his trans-
action is likely to affect price, so long as the reason for entering into the 
transaction or the profitability of the transaction does not depend on its 
effect on price.80 Thus, under the GFA definition, the motivation behind 
the transaction forms the critical element in distinguishing manipulation 
from other transactions. Specifically, manipulation occurs when the 
trader's expectation of profit derives primarily from his expectation that 
his transactions will affect the market. 81 
ticular significance because Congress gave no indication of dissatisfaction with, or desire 
to alter, the essential elements of the GFA interpretation of manipulation. Congress did, 
however, overrule the GFA on one technical point. The GFA had taken the position that 
"cross-trades" did not constitute manipulation and thus were not prohibited by the Grain 
Futures Act. See 80 Cong. Rec. 7905 (1936). When it enacted the CEA, Congress in-
cluded a provision specifically prohibiting cross-trades. See CEA, supra note 12, § 4c(A) 
(current version at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(A) (1982)); 1936 GFA Hearings, supra note 72, at 17 
(statement of Sen. Pope); 80 Cong. Rec. 7867 (1936) (statement of Sen. Connally). Inter-
estingly, Congress implemented the prohibition on cross-trades not by any change in the 
manipulation section, but by the addition of a new provision. See CEA, supra note 12, 
§ 4c(A). 
In enacting the CEA, Congress also specifically altered a Supreme Court interpretation 
concerning manipulation. In Wallace v. Cutten, 298 U.S. 229 (1936), the Court held that 
the Grain Futures Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to revoke the trading 
privileges only of those traders who were in the process of manipulating at the time of the 
revocation proceeding, but that the Secretary lost his authority over any trader once the 
alleged manipulation ceased. See id. at 236. This absurd holding completely eliminated 
the revocation proceeding's effectiveness as an enforcement mechanism. Congress cor-
rected this problem by giving the Secretary authority with respect to a person who "is 
manipulating or attempting to manipulate." 80 Cong. Rec. 6160 (1936) (statement of 
Sen. Pope) (discussing Wallace); see CEA, supra note 12, § 6(b). 
80. See Fluctuations in Wheat Futures: Letter from the Secretary of Agriculture 
Transmitting, in Response to Senate Resolution No. 222, of June 9, 1926, a Report of The 
Grain Futures Administration Relative to the Extreme Fluctuation in the Price of Wheat 
Futures During the Early Part of 1925, 6-7 (June 25, 1926) [hereinafter GFA Letter); see 
also Regulation of Grain Exchanges: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture on 
H.R. 8829, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 253 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 Grain Regulation Hearings); 
1932 Short Selling Hearings, supra note 68, at 181-85, 218-20. 
81. The position expressed by the GFA parallels the position explicitly endorsed by 
Congress with respect to manipulation of securities. A Senate report made in connection 
with the antimanipulation provision of § 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act states: 
Any extensive purchases or sales are bound to cause changes in the market 
price of the security, but mere knowledge on the part of the purchaser or seller 
that his transactions will have this effect is not sufficient to bring him within the 
scope of this provision. Thus, if a person is merely trying to acquire a large 
block of stock for investment, or desires to dispose of a big holding, his knowl-
edge that in doing so he will affect the market price does not suffice to make his 
actions unlawful. 
S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1934); see also Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper 
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 383 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910, cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 924 (1973); Opinion of the General Counsel of the SEC, Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 
3056, reprinted in [1941-47 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 75,214, at 
75,469-71 (Oct. 27, 1941); Note, Manipulation of the Stock Markets Under the Securities 
Laws, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 651, 664 (1951). 
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The GFA expressed its position repeatedly and in a variety of contexts. 
First, in 1926, in response to a Senate resolution calling for an investiga-
tion of recent fluctuations in wheat futures prices,82 the GFA reported to 
Congress that "the heavy trading by a few large professional speculators, 
aided by the reckless participation by the general public, was primarily 
responsible for wide price fluctuations, which were detrimental to legiti-
mate grain interests."83 The GFA, however, also reported that no evi-
dence existed that this heavy trading, which had so dramatically affected 
prices, constituted manipulation. 84 
The rationale for the GFA's conclusion was based on a distinction 
· made by the Secretary of Agriculture between "constructive" speculation 
and manipulation. According to the Secretary, constructive speculators 
were "[t]hose who trade on the basis of rational appraisement of present 
and prospective conditions affecting supply and demand, without at the 
same time trading in a manner or with aids designed to augment or artifi-
cially hasten the market results expected. " 85 In other words, construc-
tive speculators trade with the expectation of making a profit from price 
movements, but the expected price movements are the result of external 
factors and are not caused by the speculators' own trades. 86 The Secre-
tary concluded that such speculation is completely legal. 87 
On the other hand, manipulators, according to the Secretary of Agri-
culture, are "[t]hose who trade largely on the basis of mob psychology 
and faith in their ability through heavy trading to bring about temporary 
market conditions of which they may take advantage to make profits."88 
82. S. Res. 222, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926). 
83. GFA Letter, supra note 80, at 7. 
84. See id. 
85. Id. at 5. Representative McLaughlin offered a similar definition. According to 
him, a speculator is "[o]ne who deals under existing conditions as he interprets them but 
does not attempt to alter them" and a manipulator as one who "attempts to force artifi-
cial conditions or to exaggerate conditions for his own advantage." Jan. 1921 House 
Hearings, supra note 65, at 446. 
86. The Secretary noted that the "constructive" speculators "bought wheat futures 
because they really believed that the price of wheat at the time was low compared to what 
it would be at a future date, considering the existing and prospective supply and demand 
for wheat." GFA Letter, supra note 80, at 5. 
87. See id. at 7. 
88. Id. at 5. A definition of "manipulation" in a proposed bill to regulate cotton 
futures illustrates this approach of focusing on the trader's conduct and determining 
whether that conduct serves a legitimate purpose. The bill defined manipulation as: 
(1) Shipping or transferring to any contract market any cotton for the purpose 
of delivery on such contract market at an obvious loss on the transaction for the 
purpose of artificially influencing prices. 
(2) Tendering and repeatedly retendering on futures contracts in any desig-
nated contract market notices of delivery of the same cotton for the purpose of 
artificially influencing prices upon such contract market. 
(3) The tender upon futures contracts more than once by the same person in 
the same calander month of notices of delivery of the same cotton, or otherwise 
trafficking in notices of delivery for the purpose of artificially influencing prices. 
(4) Engaging in manipulative straddle operations of large proportions in and 
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The GFA adopted the basic position that even when an "abnormal 
movement of prices" results from a trader's activities, those trading ac-
tivities do not amount to manipulation if they we~e based on "the bona 
fide judgment of the individual traders as to proper values. " 89 
GFA administrators reinforced this understanding of manipulation in 
congressional hearings during the 1930's.9° For example, in a 1932 hear-
ing on short selling before the House Agriculture Committee, Dr. Duvel, 
Chief of the GF A, was asked a number of questions regarding why 
neither the GFA nor the Secretary of Agriculture had taken steps to 
revoke the trading privileges of large-scale traders.91 Dr. Duvel re-
sponded that the fact of a large-scale transaction, or even proof of an 
effect on the market did not, by itself, demonstrate that there was "ma-
nipulation" within the meaning of the Act. 92 Duvel stated that sanctions 
required proof that the transactions were "intentionally undertak[en] to 
manipulate the market."93 
C. Marsh-Clayton Confrontation 
As the foregoing discussion indicates, it is difficult to draw any conclu-
sion from the legislative history regarding the meaning of manipulation. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that case law has placed relatively little 
reliance on it.94 Ironically, however, the one piece of legislative history 
most frequently cited in defining manipulation is one that offers a partic-
ularly unreliable reflection of congressional understanding. That piece of 
history is a statement by a witness, Arthur Marsh, at a 1928 Senate com-
mittee hearing concerning a decline in cotton prices.95 The hearing gave 
the Senate Agriculture Committee an opportunity to observe a classic 
confrontation between Arthur Marsh, a former president of the New 
York Cotton Exchange, and William Clayton, a major cotton trader. 
Marsh previously had accused Clayton of manipulating the New Y ark 
between various cotton-futures markets with the purpose of artificially influenc-
ing the movement of prices in any cotton-futures market. 
S. 3871, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) (quoted in 1928 Cotton Futures Hearings, supra note 
72, at 1-2. 
89. GFA Letter, supra note 80, at 7. 
90. See 1934 Grain Regulation Hearings, supra note 80, at 253; 1932 Short Selling 
Hearings, supra note 68, at 181-85, 218-21. 
91. 1932 Short Selling Hearings, supra note 68, at 181-85, 218-21. Under the Grain 
Futures Act, the Secretary could impose such a sanction against a trader who was found 
to be manipulating the futures market. See Grain Futures Act, supra note 12, § 6(b). 
92. See 1932 Short Selling Hearings, supra note 68, 219-20. 
93. Id. at 185. The Assistant Chief of the GFA reiterated this point a year later. 
While testifying on legislation that ultimately became the Commodities Exchange Act, he 
explained: "This bill is not in any sense a price-fixing measure. We do not think it is 
intended to eliminate every fluctuation from the market, although we hope it will elimi-
nate those fluctuations that come about by artificial and unnatural means .... " 1934 
Grain Regulation Hearings, supra note 80, at 253. 
94. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1166 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
406 U.S. 932 (1972); Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 58 (5th Cir. 1962). 
95. 1928 Senate Cotton Hearings, supra note 67, at 201-02. 
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cotton market and had threatened to file complaints with the Depart-
ment of Justice, the New York State Attorney General and the New 
York Cotton Exchange. 96 The hearing took on a highly personal tone, 
with nearly half of the hearing being devoted to testimony of Marsh and 
Clayton and the cross-examination of each by the other's lawyer. 
There exists simply no basis to determine whether the accusations of 
manipulation made by Marsh reflect congressional understanding. 97 
Nonetheless, because the definition of manipulation offered by Marsh 
during this confrontation has been quoted repeatedly as authoritative,98 
some examination of the circumstances surrounding the Marsh-Clayton 
confrontation is appropriate. 
At the time of the alleged manipulation, cotton futures were sold in 
both New Orleans and New York. During the early 1920's, a huge cot-
ton crop caused prices in New Orleans to fall very low in comparison 
with New York cotton prices.99 With low prices and a shortage of stor-
age space in New Orleans, Clayton bought cheap cotton in the South and 
shipped it to New York, where he used it to deliver on short contracts he 
had made in the North, thereby realizing substantial profits. 100 Basi-
cally, Clayton arbitraged-he saw a differential between prices in two 
different markets and exploited this differential to make a profit for him-
self. His actions thus brought the prices in the two markets into line with 
each other. 101 
Marsh expressed several specific objections to Clayton's conduct. 
These objections are significant because they seem to reflect a hostility to 
some fundamental aspects of futures trading. Marsh's first objection was 
that Clayton had shipped large quantities of cotton to New York to cover 
his short102 contracts rather than simply buying offsetting contracts at 
whatever premium the longs103 could extract. 104 The second objection 
was that in settling his contracts, Clayton delivered the least desirable 
cotton permissible under the contract. 105 Third, and most fundamental, 
Marsh objected to the large profit that Clayton had made speculating in 
96. Id. at 110. 
97. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text 
98. See, e.g., Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 58 (5th Cir. 1962); David G. 
Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1224 (1971); Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 27,281 (CFTC 1982). 
99. 1928 Senate Cotton Hearings, supra note 67, at 108-11. 
100. See id. at 108-09, 114. 
101. See id. at 156-57. 
102. See supra note 33. 
103. See id. 
104. See 1928 Senate Cotton Hearings, supra note 67, at 227. Clayton expressed con-
cern that if he had not been prepared to deliver on his contracts, the shorts would have 
extracted a substantial premium from him. See id. at 189-90. In essence, Clayton deliv-
ered so he would not be the victim of a squeeze by the longs. 
105. See 1928 Senate Cotton Hearings, supra note 67, at 229. Marsh did not contend 
that in so doing Clayton violated the terms of his contract or the rules of the exchange. 
He simply seemed to think that it was unfair for a trader to take advantage of the shorts 
in this way. See id. 
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cotton futures at the expense of hedgers. 106 It was in this context that he 
offered the definition that is so often quoted: 
Manipulation, Mr. Chairman, is any and every operation or transac-
tion or practice, the purpose of which is not primarily to facilitate the 
movement of the commodity at prices freely responsive to the forces of 
supply and demand; but, on the contrary, is calculated to produce a 
price distortion of any kind in any market either in itself or in its rela-
tion to other markets. If a finn is engaged in manipulation it will be 
found using devices by which the prices of contracts for some one 
month in some one market may be higher than they would be if only 
the forces of supply and demand were operative; or using devices by 
means of which the price or prices of some month or months in a given 
market may be made lower than they would be if they were freely 
responsive to the forces of supply and demand. Any and every opera-
tion, transaction, device, employed to produce those abnormalities of 
price relationship in the futures markets, is manipulation. 107 
The difficulty with this definition is that it appears to impose an obliga-
tion not to act in one's own best interest. To trade simply with the expec-
tation of profit will not shelter the trader from charges of manipulation. 
According to this definition, the nonmanipulative transaction must have 
as its purpose the facilitation of the forces of supply and demand. More-
over, it is clear that under the Marsh definition, supply and demand 
means something other than what people are willing to pay in the futures 
market. Given that Marsh considered Clayton's arbitrage activities to 
constitute manipulation, Marsh apparently would have imposed on Clay-
ton the obligation to ascertain whether it would be good for overall com-
merce and industry in New York for there to be more cotton there. 108 
Marsh went on to impose an additional obligation on traders. Elabo-
rating on his definition of manipulation, he asserted that "[i]t is manipu-
lation to offer a particular grade of cotton which is being freely delivered 
on contracts, below what the generality of the trade believes to be its 
proper value in the spot markets."109 Thus, according to Marsh, anyone 
who evaluates the market differently than "the generality of the trade" 
and prices accordingly, is guilty of manipulation. 110 
106. See id. at 211. Speculators are, however, essential to the futures market, see supra 
note 69, and it is only the potential for making a profit that brings speculators into the 
market, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 358 
(1982) ("The purchase or sale of a futures contract on an exchange is ... motivated by a 
single factor-the opportunity to make a profit ... from a change in the market price."). 
107. 1928 Senate Cotton Hearings, supra note 67, at 201-02. 
108. Cf. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 27,300 (CFTC 1982) (Stone, concurring) ("We would place an 
entirely unreasonable and judicially unprecedented burden on an administrative tribunal 
if, in order to render a manipulation decision, it were required to find that the suspect 
prices were harmful to national resource allocation."). 
109. 1928 Senate Cotton Hearings, supra note 67, at 202. 
110. Clayton took the position that if little manufacturing or other commercial need 
for cotton existed in New York, then it should not have been made a delivery point. See 
generally 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, § 12.23, at 12-42 to 12-43 (observing that normal 
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There is no indication that the Senate accepted Marsh's view. 111 Other 
definitions of manipulation were offered at that hearing, 112 yet thereafter, 
Congress took no action whatsoever. 
D. "Artificial Price" in Legislative History 
While the history of federal legislation dealing with commodity futures 
trading may not be notable for what it contains, it is at least significant 
for what it lacks. The legislative history rarely mentions the concept of 
an artificial price, which many courts and commentators now regard as 
central to the meaning of manipulation. 113 The congressional debates 
during the 1920's contain references to the law of supply and demand in 
discussions of manipulation, 114 but they give little indication of what this 
meant or how it might relate to the concept of an artificial price. 115 
price relationships will not exist if contract calls for delivery of noncommercial grades at 
non-terminal points). He argued that having made New York a delivery point, it was not 
manipulation for a trader to buy cheap and sell dear on the market, as he had done, 
because this is exactly the sort of trade a free market allows and even encourages. See 
1928 Senate Cotton Hearings, supra note 67, at 154-59. 
111. Shortly after Marsh gave the above-quoted definition, Senator Smith noted that 
"there seems to be some doubt as to [the] actual meaning" of "manipulation." 1928 
Senate Cotton Hearings, supra note 67, at 220. 
112. /d. at 154, 225. 
113. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. Early legislative history touches 
indirectly upon the artificial price concept. The 1921 hearings contain a reference to the 
"artificial depression" of prices, but no reference to "artificial prices." Jan. 1921 House 
Hearings, supra note 65, at 905 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Assistant Chief of the 
GFA spoke about fluctuations brought about by "artificial ... means." 1934 Grain Reg-
ulation Hearings, supra note 80, at 253; see also GFA Leiter, supra note 80, at I. 
There is passing reference to an artificial price in the hearings that produced the 
Marsh/Clayton confrontation. See 1928 Senate Cotton Hearings, supra note 67, at 503. 
As noted earlier, however, Congress took no action based on that hearing. See supra 
notes 111-12 and accompanying text. Moreover, Senator Caraway, who used the phrase, 
exhibited a particularly high level of confusion about the operation of the market. The 
Senator expressed the view that a farmer who refused to sell today because he believed 
there would be scarcity and higher prices in the future, would be acting "artificially" and 
generating an "artificial price." See 1928 Senate Cotton Hearings, supra note 67, at 503. 
Yet, it is precisely this type of "artificial" conduct that results in economically efficient 
allocations of scarce resources over time. See generally authorities cited supra note 16. 
114. See 61 Cong. Rec. 1368, 1391, 5560 (1921). 
115. It is not at all clear that Congress had a very sophisticated notion of supply and 
demand. The frequent fluctuations of prices often were cited as proof that the market 
was not functioning properly, since the supply available each season is fixed by the har-
vest and does not fluctuate. See, e.g., 61 Cong. Rec. 1321 (1921). Boyle explained the 
problems with this argument in an early book on futures trading: 
There are two fallacies here-one on the supply side and one on the demand 
side. No one knows exactly what the supply is: it is a matter of opinion-expert 
opinion, backed by official government crop estimates plus private crop report-
ing agencies of all kinds. But it is still an estimate, a mere calculation. And the 
estimate may change overnight, due to a news report. ... And as to the demand 
side of the market, it is perfectly obvious that market news from hour to hour 
greatly affects this side of the market. The consumer-the ultimate dictator of 
the market-has his mind (and his demand) influenced by both physical and 
psychological factors, which it is unneccesary to enumerate here. 
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The only place in which any prominent discussion of the concept of an 
artificial price can be found is in the documentation of several bills intro-
duced during the 1960's proposing definitions of manipulation. 116 None 
of these bills were passed, and they were criticized largely because the 
concept of artificial price to which they referred was thought to be unrea-
sonably vague. 117 Thus, the legislative history provides little support for 
the "artifical price" approach to manipulation. 
Ill. PAST APPROACHES TO MANIPULATION 
In the 65 years since Congress first began prohibiting manipulation of 
futures, only about a dozen cases118 and even fewer law revi~w articles119 
J. Boyle, Speculation & the Chicago Board of Trade 126-27 (1920); see David G. Henner, 
30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1203 (1971); J. Boyle, supra, at 8; H. Emery, supra note 6, at 114; 
Working I, supra note 38, at 293-94. 
116. SeeS. 402, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964); S. 1980, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962); S. 
2807, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1961); see also H.R. 4685, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1954). An-
other bill, never introduced, contains similar language. See David G. Henner, 30 Agric. 
Dec. 1151, 1289 (1971) (discussing H.R. 9178, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1968)). These pro-
posals apparently came in response to the decision in General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 
170 F.2d 220, 230-31 (7th Cir. 1948), which held that intentionally stabilizing or pegging 
a price does not constitute manipulation. See David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. at 1290. 
The definition proposed in 1966 in a bill endorsed by the Department of Agriculture 
generated the most debate. The bill provided: 
The word 'manipulate' shall be construed to mean the exacting, causing or 
maintaining of an abnormal or artificial price by any course of action which 
raises, depresses, fixes, pegs, or stabilizes the price at or to a level different than 
that which would otherwise prevail. Any action resulting in the exacting, caus-
ing, or maintaining of an abnormal or artificial price shall constitute manipula· 
tion irrespective of any act[s] or omissions by the holders of futures contracts 
adversely affected by such action. 
S. 2859, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965); H.R. 11788, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1966); see David 
G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1288-89 (1971). The definition, particularly the second 
sentence, which was thought to prohibit conduct that unintentionally affected price, 
aroused considerable controversy. See To Amend the Commodity Exchange Act: Hear-
ings Before the House Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing 
and Consumer Relations on H.R. 11788, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, 77-78, 80, 93, 129, 151-
52 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 House CEA Hearings]; Vogelson, Tightened Regulation for 
Commodity Exchanges, 55 A.B.A. J. 858, 860-61 (1969). As witnesses explained, every 
trade, including perfectly legitimate transactions, has an effect on the market. See, e.g., 
1966 House CEA Hearings, supra, at 129. Moreover, all traders are aware of this. Thus, 
the test for intent must require more than knowledge that the natural and probable conse-
quences of one's trade will be to affect price. 
117. See, e.g., 1966 House CEA Hearings, supra note 116, at 92-93, 143. As the vice 
president of the Kansas City Board of Trade explained: 
[N]o member of the public has any idea of what [the Secretary of Agriculture] 
might consider "abnormal" or "artificial" .... There is no means of ascertaining 
what the price would be had it not been for the alleged conduct of an individual. 
This provision contemplates crystal-ball gazing to guess the level a commodity 
would have maintained had not a particular course of action been taken. 
Id. at 93. Ultimately, the definition was dropped from the bill, although Congress en-
acted other portions of the bill in the 1968 amendment to the CEA. 
118. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 
932 (1912); Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962); G.H. Miller & Co. v. 
United States, 260 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1958) (en bane), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907 (1959); 
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have offered any significant analysis of manipulation. A summary of the 
facts and holdings of the cases, already undertaken elsewhere, 120 will not 
be duplicated here. Instead, this Part presents an analysis of the com-
mon approaches to the manipulation problem, focusing in particular on 
the practical problems the various approaches present and on the under-
lying assumptions about the purpose of the anti-manipulation provision 
of the CEA. 
A. Manipulation as an Artificial Price 
Most definitions of manipulation focus on whether a resulting price is 
artificial, rather than on the process bringing about that price. A classic 
definition of manipulation calls it "the creation of an artificial price by 
planned action, whether by one man or a group ofmen." 121 While most 
agree that an artificial price occupies a central role in the definition of 
manipulation, 122 some diversity of views exists as to what precisely is 
meant by an "artificial price." Two basic approaches to identifying an 
artificial price have emerged, and within each approach some variations 
exist. 123 All of these attempts to define an artificial price, however, either 
prove too vague, 124 require the courts to engage in unreasonably complex 
Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 345 U.S. 
997 (1953); General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1948); Strobl v. New 
York Mercantile Exch., [1982-84] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 22,050 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); 
Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Cox, 
[1986-87 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,786 (CFTC 1987); Campania 
Salvadorena De Cafe, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,886 
(CFTC 1983); Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796 (CFTC 1982); Hohenberg Bros., [1975-77 Transfer Binder] 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 20,271 (CFTC 1977); David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 
1151 (1971). 
119. See Edwards & Edwards, A Legal and &onomic Analysis of Manipulation in Fu-
tures Markets, 4 J. Fut. Mkts. 333 (1984); Harrington, The Manipulation of Commodity 
Futures Prices, 55 St. Johns L. Rev. 240, 252-65 (1981) [hereinafter Harrington II]; Hier-
onymus, Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: Toward a Definition, 6 Hofstra L. 
Rev. 41 (1977) [hereinafter Hieronymus, Manipulation]; Johnson I, supra note 16; Mc-
Dermott, supra note 15; Van Smith, supra note 15; Note, supra note 73. 
120. See, e.g., Edwards & Edwards, supra note 119, at 337-43; Harrington II, supra 
note 119, at 252-65; Johnson, Key Coses in Manipulation, in CBOT Seminar Report on 
Research on Speculation 96 (Nov. 1980) [hereinafter Johnson III]. 
121. General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220, 231 (7th Cir. 1948) (quoting 
government's brief). 
122. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Harden, 452 F.2d 1154, 1167 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, §§ 12.22-12.29, at 12-40 to 12-43; 
Johnson I, supra note 16, at 746. 
123. See infra notes 129-67 and accompanying text. 
124. Any definition of artificial price and manipulation must be sufficiently concrete 
and specific to avoid a problem of unconstitutional vagueness. A few defendants have 
argued that the term manipulation is unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Cox, [1982-84 
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,767, at 27,076 (CFTC Initial Decision 
1983), rev'd on other grounds, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 
23,786 (CFTC 1987); David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1259 (1971). Courts have 
disposed of these arguments rather summarily with little more than a cite to Bartlett 
Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1933). See, e.g., David G. Henner, 30 Agric. 
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economic analysis, 125 or are unduly rigid. 126 
Dec. 1151, 1224 n.85 (1971). This case, however, hardly can be characterized as the 
definitive treatment of the issue. In Bartlett, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
rejected the argument that the term "manipulation" was unconstitutionally vague, basing 
its rejection on the United States Supreme Court's repeated'reference to manipulation in 
its decision in Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923). Olsen, however, had 
addressed, not the question of vagueness, but only the issue of whether Congress had the 
authority under the interstate commerce clause to regulate futures trading. See id. at 30-
31. Moreover, the Court in Olsen never explained what it thought the term manipulation 
meant. While some notions of manipulation may be sufficiently well-developed to with-
stand an attack on vagueness grounds, this citation to repeated usage by the Supreme 
Court of an undefined term, see, e.g., Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 58 (5th 
Cir. 1962), does not demonstrate that "creating an artificial price" is sufficiently specific. 
This concern regarding vagueness is not frivolous. In a series of decisions during the 
1910's and 1920's, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague certain 
economic legislation. For example, in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 
216 (1914), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Kentucky antitrust statute 
prohibiting combinations to enhance or depress the price of an article above or below its 
"real value." Id. at 221-22. "Real value" had been interpreted to mean "'market value 
under fair competition, and under normal market conditions.'" Id. at 221 (quoting state 
court opinion). The Court found the statute void for vagueness and explained: 
To compel [businessmen] to guess on peril of indictment what the community 
would have given for [goods] if the continually changing conditions were other 
than they are, to an uncertain extent; to divine prophetically what the reaction 
of only partially determinate facts would be upon the imaginations and desires 
of purchasers, is to exact gifts that mankind does not possess. 
/d. at 223-24; see American Seeding Mach. v. Kentucky, 236 U.S. 660, 661-62 (1915) 
(following International Harvester); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 637-38 (1914) 
(same). Similarly, in United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921), the Court 
struck down a federal law that made it unlawful for anyone "willfully . . . to make any 
unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries.'' 
Id. at 86; see Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 458-59 (1927); A.B. Small Co. v. 
American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 238-39 (1925); see also Connally v. General 
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1926) (discussing standards of constitutional vague-
ness). 
The temptation exists to dismiss these decisions as mere historical artifacts left over 
from "an era when economic laissez faire was for the Court the sanctum sanctorum that 
free speech has become today." Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme 
Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 77 (1960) (authored by now Professor Amsterdam); see id. 
at 75. In 1963, the Court suggested, however, in United States v. National Dairy Prod-
ucts Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963), that although vague economic regulations would be 
approached somewhat differently than would vague limits on first amendment freedoms, 
the vagueness doctrine was not a dead letter in the context of economic regulation. See 
id. at 36. National Dairy Products involved an attack on § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act 
that makes it a crime to sell goods "at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroy-
ing competition or eliminating a competitor.'' 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1982). Although the 
Court upheld the statute, it did so by construing the statute to prohibit only sales which 
were "below cost" and made with a predatory intent. 372 U.S. at 34-35. The Court 
seemed to assume that economic criteria exists for distinguishing "below cost" pricing 
from other kinds of pricing, see R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with 
Itself 78 (1978), and the Court distinguished Cohen on that basis. As the Court ex-
plained, the prohibition against "any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge" struck down 
in Cohen "was without a meaningful referent in business practice or usage. '[T]here was 
no accepted and fairly stable commercial standard which could be regarded as impliedly 
taken up and adopted by the statute ... .' " 372 U.S. at 36 (quoting A.B. Small Co. v. 
American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 240-41 (1925)). 
125. See infra notes 148-64 and accompanying text. 
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It has been argued that focusing on whether a price is artificial com-
ports with the underlying reason for condemning manipulation-that 
manipulation generates inaccurate price information that distorts the 
market. 127 Even accepting the premise that manipulation is bad because 
of its distorting effect on prices, it does not follow that focusing directly 
on prices and attempting to determine whether or not they are artificial 
represents the most efficient or effective way of preserving the pricing 
function of the futures market. Such a focus makes sense only where 
courts retain the ability to differentiate between "artificial" and "appro-
priate" prices. As described more fully below, 128 performing this differ-
entiation is, at best, a most difficult task. 
1. Meaning of "Artificial Price" 
a. Artificial Price as an Historically Unusual Price 
One approach considers a price artificial if it deviates in its relationship 
to other prices from a set of expected price relationships. 129 Simply put, 
an artificial price is one that is historically unusual, either because of its 
absolute level or because of its relationship to other prices. Most of the 
courts that have analyzed commodities manipulation apparently accept 
this approach. 130 
In determining whether a price is "unusual," courts have considered 
such factors as: the dollar price; the spread between cash and futures 
prices; the spread between the futures price in the month of the alleged 
manipulation and the price in succeeding or preceding months; and the 
spread between prices on different exchanges-all to determine if the 
price and spreads resemble those that have prevailed in the past. 131 
126. See infra notes 129-41 and accompanying text. 
127. See Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Put. L 
Rep. (CCH) 1]21,796, at 27,297-99 (CFTC 1982) (Stone, concurring). 
128. See infra notes 129-67 and accompanying text. 
129. See cases cited infra note 130. 
130. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1167 (8th Cir. 1971), cerL denied, 4{)6 
U.S. 932 (1972); Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 482 (7th Cir.), 
cerL denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953); Volkart Bros., 20 Agric. Dec. 306, 334-35 (1961), ~·a­
cated on other grounds, Vo1kart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962); G.H. 
Miller & Co., 15 Agric. Dec. 1015, 1043-46 (1956), a.ff'd on rehearing, G.H. Miller & Co. 
v. United States, 260 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1958) (en bane), cerL denied, 359 U.S. 907 
(1959). For a fuller description of the historical approach adopted in Great Western and 
Cargill, see McDermott, supra note 15, at 211-12. In addition, at least one former com-
missioner of the CFTC also has accepted this approach. See Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. 
Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Put. L. Rep. (CCH) 1J 21,796, at 27,300 (CFTC 
1982) (Stone, concurring). 
131. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1167-68 (8th Cir. 1971), cerL denied, 
4{)6 U.S. 932 (1972); Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 482 (7th 
Cir.), cerL denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953); Volkart Bros., 20 Agric. Dec. 306, 334-35 (1961), 
vacated on other grounds, Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962); G.H. 
Miller & Co., 15 Agric. Dec. 1015, 1043-46 (1956), aff'd on rehearing, G.H. Miller & Co. 
v. United States, 260 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1958) (en bane), cerL denied, 359 U.S. 907 
(1959); see generally Johnson I, supra note 16, at 749-52 (discussing spread relationships 
as indication of artificial price). 
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While this approach appears relatively straightforward, it presents a 
number of difficulties. First, for any meaningful comparison, the prices 
with which the comparison is being made must be historically compara-
ble and not themselves "artificial" or "manipulated."132 A number of 
commentators and .economists have recognized that such an assumption 
about comparability frequently is unwarranted. 133 It has been observed 
that, in many circumstances, cash prices for a commodity may be less 
reliable as an indication of actual value than are futures prices. 134 Simi-
larly, in comparing a current price with a prior price, often no basis ex-
ists for the belief that the current price, rather than the prior one, is 
artificial. As Dr. Roger Gray has explained, "while it may be true that 
the delivery month is the most likely place to look for artificial prices, it 
is also the most likely place to look for sudden corrections of mistaken or 
manipulated prices."135 
It may be possible to eliminate some of the problems surrounding what 
constitutes a "normal" price or price relationship by using broadly based 
averages derived from the prices over many years in many markets. 136 
Even with this modification, however, the historical approach suffers 
from a second and more fundamental defect. The approach seems to be 
132. See Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 482-83 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953); David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1217-18 (1971). 
133. See Gray, supra note 16, at 110; Johnson I, supra note 16, at 747; Johnson Ill, 
supra note 120, at 106-07; McDermott, supra note 15, at 211-13; Van Smith, supra note 
15, at 1585. 
134. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1168 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 
U.S. 932 (1972); Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1977-80] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 1120,964, at 23,859 n.3 (CFfC Initial Decision 1979); 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, 
§ 12.23, at 12-41; Johnson I, supra note 16, at 725, 747 n.131; McDermott, supra note 15, 
at 212. 
135. Gray, supra note 16, at 110; see McDermott, supra note 15, at 212. 
136. Professor Gray has observed that the complexity involved in thoroughly analyz-
ing such broadly based data ·~may strain the competence of the regulatory agency and the 
budget of the respondent to the point that it is unlikely to be undertaken in particular 
cases." Gray, supra note 16, at 113. Moreover, he observed that this type of 
"econometric analysis is better suited to drawing conclusions regarding large price aber-
rations than smaller ones." Id. at 111. Of course, one way for proponents of this ap-
proach to eliminate the difficulty of appearing to want "normal" prices even in abnormal 
times, is to redefine what they mean by "normal." Any changes in the supply or demand 
of the commodity or in its marketing or distribution system that would be expected to 
produce certain price changes could be taken into account in calculating a "normal" 
price. This more sophisticated econometric model could thus take into account the rele-
vant changes in conditions of the market and would identify the expected effect of those 
changes. See id. at 113. · 
This approach seems quite sensible. Unfortunately, it suffers from the precise defect 
that proponents of this approach seek to avoid: it still necessitates a subjective determina-
tion as to which conditions should be taken into account in the calculus. As Commis-
sioner Stone explained, if all market forces that contribute to shaping a price are 
considered, "there obviously can be no such thing as an artificial price." Indiana Farm 
Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1121,796, at 
27,300 (CFfC 1982) (Stone, concurring). It then becomes necessary to distinguish be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate market factors, an inquiry that raises problems of its 
owp.. See infra notes 145-67 and accompanying text. 
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based on the unstated assumption that the goal of the anti-manipulation 
provision is to stabilize prices and prevent them from deviating from his-
torical patterns. 137 Although the legislative history contains statements, 
particularly during the 1920's, suggesting that price stabilization was 
viewed as a likely and desirable by-product of regulation, 138 it does not 
appear that Congress viewed price stabilization as an end in itself, to be 
pursued regardless of underlying conditions. 139 When unusual circum-
stances exist, unusual prices should likewise exist. 140 By focusing on his-
torical comparisons, a court runs a serious risk of labeling as artificial 
any unusual price, even when unusual circumstances justify that price. 141 
Former CFIC Commissioner Stone, a proponent of the historical ap-
proach, has offered an analogy in defense of that approach that more 
aptly summarizes the approach's weaknesses. He has argued that the 
presence of an artificial or unusual price, like a body in the city morgue, 
does not prove wrongdoing has occurred, but it certainly makes us suspi-
cious. 142 I would, however, argue that the presence of an "unusual" 
price ought to be treated precisely the way a body in the morgue is-it 
137. Some cases at least implicitly accept this as the goal. For example, in Cargill, the 
court asserted that among "[t]he main economic functions performed by the futures mar-
ket [is] the stabilization of commodity prices .... " Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 
1154, 1173 (8th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972). Similarly, 
Commissioner Johnson stressed in Indiana Farm Bureau that the aim of the CFfC 
should be "to maintain orderly futures trading." Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 
[1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 27,292 (CFfC 1982). 
138. The Senate Report to the Future Trading Act stated, "[i]t is believed that this bill 
will, by wiping out obvious abuses that are practiced on the grain exchanges, result in 
more stable markets .... " S. Rep. No. 212, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1921). 
139. A colloquy in the House debate on the Future Trading Act between Representa-
tive Tincher, a member of the House Agriculture Committee, and several colleagues illus-
trates this point Representative Tincher was asked whether he hoped that the bill would 
"tend to stabilize the price of wheat when it is up and prevent the forcing of it down by 
speculation." 61 Cong. Rec. 1314 (1921) {Rep. McKenzie). He responded that this was 
the goal. See id. (Rep. Tincher). That, however, did not end the discussion. Others 
pushed Tincher on this concept, inquiring whether he also hoped to stabilize low prices. 
See id. (Rep. Connally). Tincher responded that his goal was not to stabilize prices, but 
rather to insure that prices properly reflect underlying conditions of supply and demand. 
See id. (Rep. Tincher). 
While Tincher and others clearly believed that a market free from manipulation was 
likely to be more stable, it is also clear that they viewed price stability not as an end in 
itself, but as a by-product of a properly functioning market. This point was made quite 
explicitly in 1934 by a GFA administrator testifying before Congress, who observed that 
the anti-manipulation provision "is not in any sense a price-fixing measure." 1934 Grain 
Regulation Hearings, supra note 80, at 253. 
140. See supra note 40 and accompanying text 
141. Compare Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1977-80] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 20,964, at 23,857-59 (CFTC Initial Decision 1979) (finding that the price was 
artificial) (decision of ALJ) with Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer 
Binder] Comm. Fut L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 27,286-87 (CFfC 1982) (decision of 
Commission) (unusual price economically justified in light of unusual conditions) and 
Hieronymus, How the Practical Aspects of Testimony Directed Some Research, in CBOT 
Seminar Report on Research on Speculation 56 (1980) (same). 
142. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 27,299 (CFTC 1982). 
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makes us suspicious and causes us to investigate but does not itself repre-
sent an element of an offense. 
The CFfC, in its most recent manipulation decision, has recognized 
the limitations of historical or other price comparisons. 143 While not re-
jecting outright historical and spread comparisons, the Commission held 
that "it is incumbent on the parties to explain or justify the relevance of 
such evidence."144 
b. Artificial Price as One Not Reflecting Legitimate 
Supply and Demand 
Another approach defines artificial price as a price that does not reflect 
the "basic" or "legitimate" forces of supply and demand. 145 The CFfC 
decision in Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass'n 146 endorsed this ap-
proach, defining an artificial price as one "which does not reflect the mar-
ket or economic forces of supply and demand operating upon the price of 
the particular contract under scrutiny. It is, in economic language, a 
non-equilibrium price."147 
"Supply and demand," like artificial price, can prove a slippery con-
cept. 148 It is sometimes supposed that supply can be determined by 
counting the physical quantity of the good in existence, and demand can 
be determined by ascertaining the current level of use for the good. 149 
An exchange between William Clayton and Senator Caraway regarding 
143. See Cox, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,786, at 
34,064 (CFTC 1987). 
144. Id. The Commission expressed a similar view about the usefulness of compari-
sons between cash and futures prices, noting that "cash market prices offer only a crude 
measuring tool ... against which to compare the artificial nature of futures prices." I d. 
at 34,065. 
145. Indiana Farm Bureau, at 27,288 n.2 (quoted with approval in Cox, at 34,064); see 
Hohenberg Bros., [1975-77 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 20,271, at 
21,477 (CFTC 1977); Hieronymus, Manipulation, supra note 119, at 45. 
One commentator has observed that "[a]lthough as a matter of principle, an artificial 
price is thought by the courts to be one that does not reflect the forces of supply and 
demand, in practice the test of an artificial price generally involves demonstrating that 
normal price relationships have been disturbed." Anderson, The Industrial Organization 
of Futures Markets: A Survey, in The Industrial Organization of Futures Markets 10 (R. 
Anderson ed. 1984). This suggests that one might accept both the approaches to artificial 
price described herein, treating the focus on historical relationships as the practical appli-
cation of the more theoretical concern regarding supply and demand. 
146. [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796 (CFTC 1982). 
147. Id. at 27,288 n.2 (CTFC 1982). See Cox, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,786, at 34,064 (CFTC 1987). Unfortunately, the Commission has 
offered little guidance as to how one should ascertain supply and demand. In Cox, the 
most recent CFTC manipulation case, the Commission reaffirmed the language of Indi-
ana Farm Bureau, but then it did little analysis of the conditions of supply and demand in 
the relevant market. See id. The bulk of the analysis in Cox was devoted to demonstrat-
ing that the AU had incorrectly analyzed historical and other comparative data. See id. 
at 34,064-66. 
148. See generally Working, A Theory of Anticipatory Prices, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 188 
(1958) [hereinafter Working III] (discussing role of expectations in determining prices). 
149. See H. Emery, supra note 6, at 114. 
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the situation where farmers might hold back crops from the market ex-
pecting the price to rise may best illustrate this view of supply and de-
mand. 150 The Senator agreed with Clayton that, were farmers to do this, 
the result would be an immediate increase in price, but he viewed the 
increase as "artificial" and "unnatural" because "there would not be a 
bale more to supply the demand." 151 It is, of course, this "unnatural" 
conduct on the part of the farmer that helps ration scarce supplies over 
time and reduces wide price fluctuations. 152 
The situation described in the Caraway/Clayton exchange also illus-
trates a broader principle: not all of the physically existing supply of a 
storable commodity will be made available for immediate use; some of 
the commodity will be stored for later consumption. The amount stored 
reflects expectations about future prices. 153 Such expectations about 
price changes, however, defy direct measurement. 154 Determining "sup-
ply and demand" is not a simple mechanical process, 155 since "neither 
supply schedules nor demand schedules have tangible manifestations in a 
marketplace."156 It is necessary to take into account a wide spectrum of 
unquantifiable factors. 157 As Professor Gray has observed, "if Mt. St. 
Helens erupts, or the Ayatollah dies, or the Secretary of Agriculture tells 
a new fib, or the budworm comes over from Mexico, these and a host of 
other excluded factors may produce a price abnormality or ... aberra-
tion, temporary or sustained, which is not an artificial price."158 
Moreover, in assessing whether a past price reflects supply and de-
mand, one must look, not at whether that price reflects conditions as we 
now know them, but at whether it reflects conditions as they were then 
understood. 159 For example, if, at a particular time, there existed strong 
reason to believe that there would be a crop surplus, one would expect 
the price at that time to reflect that expected surplus. The fact that at 
some later time an unanticipated event may create a shortage and drive 
the price up does not make the earlier price "wrong." A "good" price 
reflects all of the then-available information, not clairvoyance about fu-
ture events. 
150. 1928 Senate Cotton Hearings, supra note 67, at 503. 
151. Id. 
152. See Working II, supra note 42, at 326. 
153. See David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1203 (1971); Working, New Concepts 
Concerning Futures Markets and Pnces, 52 Am. Econ. Rev. 431, 443-44 (1962) [hereinaf-
ter Working IV]; Working III, supra note 148, at 191. 
154. See Telser, Futures Trading and the Storage of Cotton and Wheat, 66 J. Pol. Econ. 
333 (1958); Working I, supra note 38, at 294. 
155. Moreover, determining existing supply and current demand can be quite difficult. 
No one ever knows precisely how much supply or demand there is for any given com-
modity. These can only be estimated based on various reports and calculations. See J. 
Boyle, supra note 115, at 126. 
156. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L 
Rep. (CCH) 1]21,796, at 27,300 (CFTC 1982) (Stone, concurring). 
157. See Working III, supra note 77, at 195. 
158. Gray, supra note 16, at 110. 
159. See Tomek, supra note 9, at 19; Working IV, supra note 153, at 447. 
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In the antitrust area, the Supreme Court long has rejected any inquiry 
into the reasonableness of prices resulting from price-fixing, fearing that 
such inquiry would take the Court into a very complex area of economic 
analysis that they were ill-equipped to handle. 160 The problems associ-
ated with assessing the reasonableness of prices in the price-fixing context 
occur with equal frequency in the area of futures trading. Trying to de-
termine the proper price for a particular commodity in a particular 
month can launch the fact finder into an extremely difficult and arcane 
area. 161 
For example, in Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass'n, 162 the admin-
istrative law judge ("AU") received testimony from numerous expert 
witnesses, each analyzing in detail the operation of the cash and futures 
markets for corn, nationwide supply and demand for corn at the time of 
the alleged manipulation, and historical levels and relationships of corn 
prices. 163 As an ALJ for the CFTC, the judge who handled Indiana 
Farm Bureau most likely had some familiarity with futures trading, if 
not with the particular issues involved. 
Manipulation cases, however, are not confined solely to administrative 
proceedings. Parties can bring suit in federal court, 164 before judges and 
juries who know nothing about futures trading and even less about soy-
beans, pork bellies, stock indices or the other traded commodities. More-
over, an approach that focuses on resulting prices must assume that not 
only is it possible, with the benefit of scores of experts, to identify the 
proper price after the fact, but that traders can identify this price while 
actively engaged in trading and can conform their conduct accordingly. 
It is not clear that this assumption is appropriate given the fast pace of 
futures trading. 
160. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-22 (1940) 
("Congress has not left with us the determination of whether ... particular price-fixing 
schemes are wise or unwise .... "); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 
396-97 (1927) (rejecting argument that a price fixing agreement is reasonable and, there-
fore, permitted, even if resulting prices are reasonable). 
In addition to these practical considerations regarding proof, the Court apparently has 
concluded that the fundamental goal of the Sherman Act is not to preserve some particu-
lar set of prices or some particular formula for determining prices (for example, cost plus 
a certain profit), see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d 
Cir. 1945), but, instead, to preserve a particular process for determining price. As the 
Court explained in Socony- Vacuum: "[M]arket manipulation in its various manifesta-
tions is implicitly an artificial stimulus applied to (or at times a brake on) market prices, a 
force which distorts those prices, a factor which prevents the determination of those 
prices by free competition alone." 310 U.S. at 223. 
161. One commentator has suggested that the complexity involved in proving a dis-
torted price has made manipulation a very difficult offense to prosecute. See Van Smith, 
supra note 15, at 1580; see also Gray, supra note 16, at 113 (the complexity of determin-
ing under traditional criteria whether manipulation has occurred "may strain the compe-
tence of the regulatory agency and the budget of the respondent to the point that it is 
unlikely to be undertaken in particular cases"). 
162. [1977-80] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 20,964 (CFTC Initial Decision 1979). 
163. See id. at 23,839-57. 
164. See 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1982). 
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Last, although one court relying on supply and demand analysis has 
held that a price deviating from the "proper" price by less than 1.5% was 
artificial, 165 the complex analysis required generally is not well-suited for 
detecting small price aberrations. 166 It is simply unrealistic to believe 
that a court, unfamiliar with the industry, can sort through the complex 
data and determine the proper price with the required degree of 
certainty.167 
2. Additional Problems with the Artificial Price Approach 
In addition to the problem of identifying an artificial price, the ap-
proach focusing on an artificial price suffers from other related deficien-
cies. One problem is that a definition of manipulation centering on the 
creation of an artificial price proves completely inadequate to deal with 
unsuccessful attempts to manipulate. Attempted manipulation is illegal 
and carries the same sanctions as does successful manipulation. 168 If it is 
difficult to determine whether a realized price is artificial, surely it is even 
more difficult to determine what price would have resulted had the at-
165. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1169 (8th Cir. 1971) {observing that 
the market price was $2.27 to $2.28 and 1/4 per bushel, mther than S2.25 per bushel), 
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972). As Russo has pointed out, the court failed to indicate 
whether any of the price differences it observed were statistically significant. See 1 T. 
Russo, supra note 13, § 12.27, at 12-49. 
166. See Gray, supra note 16, at 111. 
167. Further complicating matters is the fact that advocates of this approach do not 
mean to suggest that all factors that affect futures prices are to be taken into account to 
determine if the price properly reflects those factors. As CFTC Chairman Johnson 
noted, "if all influences in the futures market are absorbed into the supply/demand equa-
tion, it would follow logically and almost automatically that no futures price could be 
considered artificial .... " Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Tmnsfer Binder] 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCII) 1]21,796, at 27,295 n.8 (CFTC 1982) {emphasis in original); 
see id. at 27,300 (Stone, concurring). Former CFTC Chairman Johnson advocates one 
approach to determining what factors are legitimate. Johnson, who also concurred in 
Indiana Farm Bureau, solves the dilemma of deciding which market conditions should be 
legitimately considered with the simple answer that a market factor that affects the fu-
tures price cannot be considered unless it affected the cash price to an equal degree. I d. at 
27,291. 
This latter approach, however, appears to misperceive the purpose of the futures mar-
kets. Futures markets exist, in part, because of their ability to respond more quickly to 
changes in conditions than do cash markets. Johnson apparently assumes that, if a mar-
ket condition causes more reaction in the futures market than the cash market, it must be 
the futures price which overreacted. Moreover, this approach may be underinclusive, as 
artificial market conditions such as false rumors, that affect both cash and futures prices, 
apparently would not constitute manipulation. See McDermott, supra note 15, at 212-13. 
Deciding which supply and demand factors are "legitimate" has proven controversial. 
In particular, a question has arisen whether the demand genemted by shorts needing to 
cover their obligations qualifies as a "real" demand which should be included in the cal-
culation. See infra note 242 and accompanying text. At least one court has suggested 
that this demand should not be included. See Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 
201 F.2d 476, 482 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953). 
168. 7 U.S.C. § 13b (1982); see Comment, Commodities: Futures Control-Manipula-
tion Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 1243, 1252 (1973). 
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tempts been successful and whether that unknown price would have been 
artificial. 
Another, even more troubling problem with placing the focus on the 
resulting price is that it apparently legitimizes a defense that even the 
proponents of the artificial price approach agree should not be al-
lowed. 169 If it is illegal to cause prices to move away from the "appropri-
ate" level, the corollary of this would seem to be that it is legal to 
intentionally cause prices to move toward that "appropriate" level. 170 
General Foods Corp. v. Brannan 171 illustrates this potential defense. In 
this case, a group of traders were charged with manipulating the price of 
rye by purchasing large quantities of "distress rye" that was about to be 
dumped on the market and that the traders feared would cause a dra-
matic decline in the price of rye. 172 They hoped by their purchases to 
maintain the price at the level which then prevailed. 173 The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that this activity did not constitute 
manipulation, stressing that the whole purpose of defendants' conduct 
was to stabilize the price-that is, to maintain the price existing prior to 
the introduction of the distress rye. 174 
The General Foods decision has been criticized widely and justifia-
bly, 175 but its holding logically flows from the traditional emphasis on 
artificial price. The court's approach suggests that a trader is forbidden 
to do anything that produces an unusual price, even in unusual times. 
The corollary, however, is that a trader may do anything to maintain the 
usual price and to prevent that price from being affected by unusual 
conditions. 
David G. Henner 176 provides another illustration of how this defense 
might be used. There, the accused manipulator bid up the price of eggs 
at the close of trading. 177 Defendant argued that eggs were then under-
priced and that he had intended simply to cause the market to notice the 
low price and to properly assess and price eggs. 178 In essence, defendant 
argued that because the price was artificially low, his actions merely rep-
resented an attempt to move the market to a non-artificial level. How-
ever one defines artificial price, this specious defense apparently will be 
169. See infra note 175. 
170. In the area of antitrust, the Supreme Court has rejected inquiry into the reasona-
bleness of resulting prices, giving as one reason that it did not want to open the door to 
this defense. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. ISO, 221 (1940). 
171. 170 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1948). 
172. Id. at 229. 
173. Id. at 230. 
174. Id. at 231. 
175. See, e.g., David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1228-32 (1971); 1 T. Russo, 
supra note 13, § 12.24, at 12-43 to 12-44; Johnson I, supra note 16, at 754; McDermott, 
supra note 15, at 205 n.12; Note, Federal Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading, 60 
Yale L.J. 822, 842 (1951). 
176. 30 Agric. Dec. 1151 (1971). 
177. Id. at 1161-62. 
178. Id. at 1177. 
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available to all manipulators who assert that they intended not to create 
an artificial price, but to move the market away from an artificial 
price.179 
A third problem presented by the artificial price approach to manipu-
lation results from the fact that courts and commentators using this ap-
proach agree that for liability to exist, the defendant must have both 
"intended" that artificial price180 and "caused" that price. 181 The con-
cepts of intent and causation in this context have proved almost as slip-
pery as the concept of artificial price itself. 
On the issue of intent, general agreement now exists that the defendant -
must have acted with more than the mere knowledge that a consequence 
of his actions would be to affect the price; rather, he actually must have 
intended to create an artificial price. 182 For example, the CFfC has 
stated that the defendant must have intended to create a price that does 
"not reflect the legitimate forces of supply and demand." 183 Unfortu-
nately, the manipulator is unlikely to have intended anything about 
whether the price reflected legitimate supply and demand or whether the 
price is consistent with historical patterns. A manipulator intends to 
make as much money as possible, and is unlikely to care whether the 
price does or does not reflect legitimate supply and demand. 184 The ma-
nipulator probably will feel similar indifference as to whether the result-
ing price is consistent with historical patterns. The historically 
consistent price may or may not be the price at which the manipulator 
179. The AU in David G. Henner quite properly rejected this argument. The AU 
concluded that any given price is not, in and of itself, either normal or abnormal, appro-
priate or artificial. It is the conditions creating the price that are either normal or artifi-
cial. Id. at 1207. The AU held that conduct intended solely to affect price was artificial 
and thus the resulting price, no matter how high, how low, how stable, or how consistent 
with history, was "artificial." I d. at 1198. The AU in Henner, like the Court in Socony-
Vacuum, focused on interference with a process, rather than on whether the resulting 
price was, in and of itself, either good or bad. 
180. See, e.g., Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 59 (5th Cir. 1962); Great W. 
Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 479 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 
(1953); Cox, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,786, at 34,061 
(CFTC 1987); Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. 
L. Rep. (CCH) 1121,796, at 27,283 (CFTC 1982); 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, § 12.19, at 
12-31 to 12-32; Johnson I, supra note 16, at 755. 
181. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1169 (8th Cir. 1971), cen. denied, 
406 U.S. 932 (1972); Cox, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 
23,786, at 34,066-68 (CFTC 1987); Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer 
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 21,796, at 27,301 (CFTC 1982) (Stone, concur-
ring); 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, § 12.21, at 12-37 to 12-40; Johnson I, supra note 16, at 
754. 
182. See, e.g., 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, § 12.19, at 12-31; Johnson I, supra note 16, at 
755-59 and cases cited therein. 
183. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 11 21,796, at 27,283 (CFTC 1982). 
184. In fact, manipulators are likely to be firm believers in supply and demand. They 
rely on these forces to accomplish their schemes by reducing supply or increasing de-
mand, with the firm expectation that a change in price wiU result. 
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makes a profit. But it is making a profit, not altering historical patterns, 
that interests the would-be manipulator. 
To frame an intent element in terms of something that most manipula-
tors have either never thought of, or if they have thought of it, are totally 
indifferent to, simply invites unnecessary complication. To use Dr. 
Stone's analogy, 185 society would never define murder as intentionally 
causing a body to end up in the city morgue. 186 To solve the problems 
created by such a definition, courts either must rely on convoluted no-
tions of intent or attribute to people intentions and expectations bearing 
little relation to what they actually think about or even reasonably can be 
expected to think about. 
The issue of causation creates similar problems. Defining causation in 
this context can be as difficult as identifying whether the price is artifi-
cial. 187 The problem stems from the fact that price formation is a two-
sided process: it requires the agreement of both a buyer and a seller. 188 
Asking whether the buyer or the seller "caused" the price, thus, is use-
less-like trying to cut with only one blade of a scissor. 189 Focus by the 
courts on the price formation stage after the conditions affecting the bar-
gaining process have fully developed creates a related problem in at-
tempting to establish who "caused" an artificial price. There simply 
exists no meaningful way to determine who, in the two-sided bargaining 
process, "caused" the price. 
Some courts have dealt with the problem of delineating causation sim-
ply by inferring a causal link whenever the defendant holds a dominant 
position in the futures market. 190 As the Chief Administrative Law 
185. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
186. See supra note 142. 
187. As the Commission noted in Cox, "considerable confusion still surrounds the ele-
ment of causation." Cox, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 
23,786, at 34,067 (CFTC 1987). 
188. See Hieronymus, Manipulation, supra note 119, at 54-55; Van Smith, supra note 
15, at 1587. 
189. In Cox, the Commission recognized that a price rise may be the result of conduct 
by both longs and shorts. See Cox, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 23,786, at 34,062, 34,066-68. It further held that in order to find liability, it was 
necessary first to "sortO out" the "multiple causes." Id. at 34,068. Unfortunately, the 
Commission was somewhat unclear about the liability rules to be applied once this "sort-
ing out" had occurred. The Commission stated that it is sufficient for liability that a 
party "played a substantial part" in bringing about the artificial price. Id. at 34,066 n.8. 
It also stated that proof that some factor other than the defendant's conduct "materially 
contributed to the artificial prices" would constitute an affirmative defense. Id. at 34,067. 
This affirmative defense suggests that where there are multiple material causes, no party 
can be held liable. Yet after having analyzed the facts in Cox and concluding that "the 
price rise was the result of several competing factors," the Commission went on to state 
that "[i]n these circumstances, it was not appropriate for the AU [to find liability] with-
out first sorting out the multiple causes." Id. at 34,068. This implies that liability could 
be found notwithstanding the existence of multiple causes and the affirmative defense, 
provided the AU first engaged in a proper "sorting out,'' yet the Commission did not 
elaborate on what specifically the AU should seek to identify in this sorting out process. 
190. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1164 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 
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Judge of the CFTC has explained, "Causation has been construed to be 
present when 'a long has sufficient control of enough futures contracts to 
force the shorts to come to him to settle their contracts.' " 191 
The focus on market dominance as a surrogate for causation, however, 
is misplaced. 192 Market dominance constitutes neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition to manipulation. David G. Henner 193 provides the 
clearest example of a situation in which dominance was not necessary for 
a finding of manipulation. 194 There, the defendant bid up the price of 
eggs at the close of the day. 195 He had hoped to make it appear that a 
"key reversal" had occurred so that "chartists," who trade on the basis 
of past price moves, would enter the market and bid the price up fur-
ther. 196 The AU had no problem finding this to be an illegal attempt to 
manipulate, even though Henner's total position in the market was 
small.l97 
Market dominance also fails as a sufficient condition to give rise to a 
U.S. 932 (1972); Compania Salvadorena De Cafe, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. 
L. Rep. (CCII) ~ 21,886, at 27,817 (CFfC 1983). 
191. Compania Salvadorena De Cafe, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L Rep. 
(CCII)~ 21,886, at 27,817 (quoting Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1164); see Edwards & Edwards, 
supra note 119, at 336. 
192. The emphasis on market dominance creates yet another set of problems for the 
courts. In determining whether a defendant dominated the cash market. the court must 
first decide what to include in that market. Typically, the courts focus on the "delivera-
ble supply," that is, goods that could have been delivered to fulfill the futures contract. 
See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1164-65 (8th Cir. 1971), cerL denied, 4{)6 U.S. 
932 (1972); Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 59-60 (5th Cir. 1962); 1 T. Russo, 
supra note 13, § 12.13, at 12-20 to 12-22, § 12.14, at 12-26 to 12-27; Johnson III, supra 
note 120, at 101; Johnson I, supra note 16, at 733-42. But few courts agree on how 
broadly to construe this concept: should it include, for example, only those goods that 
were in fact deliverable at the expiration of the contract. or should it include goods that 
could have been made deliverable if the necessary steps had been taken? If a court takes 
the latter approach, then it must decide whether to include goods that could have been 
made deliverable only with considerable expense and effort. The courts seem to lack any 
coherent theory in analyzing these questions, and the approaches vary considerably. 
Compare Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 59-60 (5th Cir. 1962) (mcluding in 
deliverable supply cotton located at approved delivery points, but for which the shorts 
had failed to obtain certification) and Cox, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L 
Rep. (CCII)~ 23,786, at 34,062-63 (CFfC 1987) (holding that deliverable supply must 
be analyzed "as it emerged throughout the delivery month,'' not merely in the context of 
the last day of trading and that out-of-town premium grades should not be excluded 
routinely from deliverable supply) with Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1165-66 
(8th Cir. 1971) (excluding from available supply wheat where cost of shipment was an 
economic impediment to its delivery), cerL denied, 4{)6 U.S. 932 (1972) and Cox, at 
34,071 (West, Comm'r, dissenting) (arguing that deliverable supply should not include 
supplies that "could have been present had the shorts acted differently") (emphasis in 
original). See 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, § 12.13, at 12-20 to 12-22, § 12.14, at 12-26 to 
12-27; Johnson III, supra note 120, at 101-02; Johnson I, supra note 16, at 733-42. 
193. 30 Agric. Dec. 1151 (1971). 
194. See 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, §§ 12.18 & 12.29; Harrington II, supra note 119, at 
269. 
195. 30 Agric. Dec. at 1161-62. 
196. Id. at 1178. 
197. Id. at 1232-34. 
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presumption of manipulation. 198 The fact that a particular trader holds a 
large percentage of the open interest proves little. As the maturity date 
approaches, markets almost always become more concentrated, and the 
last trader in the market will necesssarily controllOO% of the market. 199 
Courts tend to pick out concentration figures and then conclude whether 
those figures are unreasonably high based on comparisons to other cases 
involving different markets.200 As one noted commentator has observed, 
however, empirical evidence on which to make a meaningful assessment 
of these concentration figures remains unavailable: 
We don't know what the typical concentration ratio in a particular 
delivery month is, with four days, seven minutes, or any other interval 
of trading time remaining. We don't know what factors influence 
changes from year to year, or the rate of change within a year, in con-
centration ratios for particular markets and delivery months.201 
Those cases that do not infer causation on the basis of the defendant's 
position attempt to ascertain who bears responsibility for the price. 202 
Most of these courts use a lexicon suggesting some concept of moral fault 
or culpability. The cases speak of traders acting with "excessive 
greed,"203 acting irresponsibly,204 or demonstrating "foolishness."205 
The difficulty with this approach is that no standards exist for deter-
mining when it is greedy or wrong to "hold out" for a higher price and 
when such behavior is normal and appropriate. For traders to try to sell 
at the highest price they can or to "hold out" for a more advantageous 
price represents normal activity in the futures market as well as all other 
markets. 206 As the CFTC has observed, the desire of traders for greater 
profit "gives lifeblood to the forces of supply and demand, and makes the 
198. See McDermott, supra note 15, at 210-11. 
199. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1164 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 
U.S. 932 (1972); Tomek, supra note 9, at 10. 
200. See, e.g., Compania Salvadorena De Cafe, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Put. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,886, at 27,817 n.29 (CFTC 1983); McDermott, supra note 15, at 210-
11. 
201. Gray, supra note 16, at 111-12. Further, as Russo has observed, it is odd that 
only the large trader is "punished for his or her size, while many smaller long speculators, 
gambling on the large trader's presence and ability and willingness to force prices up-
ward, go along for a free ride." 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, at 12-50. 
202. See Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 59-60 (5th Cir. 1962); Indiana Farm 
Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Put. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 
27,286 (CFTC 1982). 
203. Sam Wong & Son, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 735 F.2d 653, 674 (2d Cir. 
1984). 
204. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Put. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 27,286 (CFTC 1982); see Cox, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] 
Comm. Put. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,786, at 34,062, 34,068 (CFTC 1987). 
205. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Put. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 27,303 (CFTC 1982) (Stone, concurring); see Johnson III, supra 
note 120, at 105. 
206. See Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Put. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 27,284-85 (CFTC 1982); Hohenberg Bros., [1975-77 Transfer 
Binder] Comm. Put. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 20,271, at 21,478 (CFTC 1977). 
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price discovery function of the marketplace viable. "207 How can one tell 
when this conduct becomes blameworthy? 
The Eighth Circuit's analysis in Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin 208 illustrates 
this problem well. There, the court concluded that the price of wheat 
had risen as high as it did because of "the high prices [Cargill] set for 
liquidation."209 Apparently the court believed that Cargill "caused" the 
high price because it asked for and received that price. But surely the 
shorts likewise "caused" the price by agreeing to pay that much. If the 
shorts simply had scoffed at Cargill's offer and responded that they 
would not pay a penny over $2.25, then the price would not have gone 
over $2.25 because the parties would not have consummated the deal at a 
higher price. 210 
Thus, the rule that emerges requires that traders who stand in a posi-
tion to benefit from an unusual situation must not be too greedy, while 
those who stand to lose must not panic in a childish or irresponsible 
manner.211 Under this approach, the manipulation prohibition functions 
as a kind of code of good conduct.212 Unfortunately, these rules of the 
code of good conduct are quite vague, 213 and traders bear a high price for 
not knowing them. Even more fundamental, however, this approach 
suggests that the purpose of the manipulation prohibition is to prevent 
207. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 1!21,796, at 27,283 (CFTC 1982). 
208. 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); see Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 358 (1982) ("The purchase 
or sale of a futures contract on an exchange is . . . motivated by a single factor-the 
opportunity to make a profit (or to minimize the risk ofloss) from a change in the market 
price."). 
209. Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1170. 
210. Of course, under some circumstances, an offer or bid might be thought to cause a 
price increase. This might be the case if the offer is not itself a good faith offer that the 
offeror expects to be accepted, but instead is intended to convey false information in order 
to create panic. See, e.g., David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1234 (1971). There is 
no indication that this was the case in Cargill. 
211. Not long before Philip Johnson became Chairman of the CFTC, he gave the fol-
lowing description of the law of manipulation: 
What is a long to do when a short, who should have made preparation for 
delivery, comes begging to hini to get out of the market? What is a long to do? 
Remember that these are competitive markets. These markets work only as 
long as everybody is fighting to get the best possible price he can. What is a 
long to do? I think the policy of the CFTC says: "Faced with that situation, 
pull your punches; don't get the best price you can; don't negotiate toughly; let 
the guy out somehow. Otherwise, face a manipulation investigation and the 
strong possibility that instead of blaming him for having put himself in this 
predicament, you're going to get charged with a manipulation." 
Johnson III, supra note 120, at 106. 
212. See Note, supra note 73, at 184 (a future contract should be understood to include 
"good faith" provision that buyer will not demand delivery simply to force a price 
increase). 
213. See 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, at 12-50 (criticizing Cargill because it "places the 
holder of a large long position in the position of having to police his or her own conduct 
in what is usually a dynamic, nebulous situation"). 
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greed or unfair profits. This view of the prohibition is unwarranted. As 
the Second Circuit has observed, a commodity exchange "is not a social 
club."214 Throughout the legislative history of federal futures trading 
regulation, the concern with respect to manipulation has focused on 
curbing the price effects of manipulation and maintaining a functioning 
market, not on whether some traders were becoming too rich at other 
traders' expense. 215 
B. Alternatives to the "Artificial Price" Approach 
Within the last few years two alternative approaches to defining ma-
nipulation have been proposed. Both of the approaches focus on a 
trader's threat to demand delivery and downplay the concept of artificial 
price. Though the move away from a focus on the resulting price repre-
sents a step in the right direction, each of these approaches suffers from 
conceptual problems.216 Moreover, because both focus primarily on only 
one particular type of manipulation, known as a "comer" or 
"squeeze,"217 their utility is limited largely to analyzing this particular 
214. Sam Wong & Son, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 735 F.2d 653, 678 (2d Cir. 
1984). No one questions that the futures markets do rely on fraternal concepts of fair 
play and proper conduct to some extent. An exchange sometimes may appeal to such 
notions to persuade a trader to reduce a position or to accept or take other steps that the 
trader might not be legally obligated to take. See id. at 673-74; Cox, [1986-87 Transfer 
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,786, at 34,059-60 (CFTC 1987); Indiana Farm 
Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 
27,289 n.18 (CFTC 1982). 
215. See, e.g., CEA, supra note 12, at § 3; H.R. Rep. No. 975, supra note 31, at 34 
(explaining that the danger of manipulation is that it destroys usefulness of market to 
hedgers); H.R. Rep. No. 421, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935) (goal was to control "those 
forms of speculative activity which too often demoralize the markets to the injury of 
producers and consumers and the exchanges themselves"); S. Rep. No. 212, 67th Cong., 
1st Sess. 4 (1921) ("[T]his bill will, by wiping out obvious abuses ... result in more stable 
markets, and thereby enable the producers to secure more nearly the market price for 
their grain than has been possible in the past."). For a more detailed discussion of vari-
ous views of the purpose of the manipulation prohibition, see infra notes 273-94 and 
accompanying text. 
216. See infra notes 220-55 and accompanying text. 
217. A "corner" or "squeeze" is a method of exploiting the congestion that can occur 
at the end of the delivery month, by which time all contracts must be settled. Specifically, 
this congestion arises in the following manner: 
By continuing long up to and into the delivery month, speculative short sellers 
find it increasingly difficult to buy in their contracts. The short interest, it will 
be recalled, has the option of choosing the day during the delivery month when 
the actual commodity will be delivered. This option only serves to postpone the 
time when an ultimate settlement will have to be made. With the hope that 
prices will break or that the long interest will take the initiative and liquidate, 
they may carry along their position well into the delivery month with little 
thought of acquiring the necessary supplies. At the end of the month when 
delivery must be made supplies may be scarce and, in a frantic effort to close out 
their position, the current future advances rapidly. This process may or may 
not be accompanied by any manipulative intent but in any event it is an artificial 
situation producing a temporary derangement in prices. 
G. Hoffman, supra note 78, at 315. It is possible to create a similar type of abnormal 
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price situation by the shorts threatening to make delivery and thereby depressing the 
price. This is much more rare than a squeeze or comer by the longs but it is not unheard 
of. See Cargill, Inc., 29 Agric. Dec. 880, 906 (1970), ajf'd, Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 
F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cerL denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); Vincent W. Kosuga, 19 
Agric. Dec. 603, 622 (1960); Hohenberg Bros., [1975-77 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L 
Rep. (CCH) 1!20,271 (CFTC 1977); T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 325; G. 
Hoffman, supra note 78, at 313-15. 
A situation such as the one described above can develop inadvertently, see VII Federal 
Trade Commission, Report on the Grain Trade 243 (1926) [hereinafter FTC Report], but 
when a trader consciously creates or exploits such a situation, it is known as a "comer" 
or "squeeze". 
The distinction between a comer and a squeeze is not precise. and, in fact, the terms 
frequently are used interchangeably. See David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1286 
(1971). When a distinction is drawn, "comer'' describes the situation where a trader 
intentionally causes a price to rise by acquiring a dominant position in the futures market 
and simultaneously achieving sufficient dominance in the cash market "to dry up the 
sources of deliverable goods." Note, supra note 73, at 175; see Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 
452 F.2d 1154, 1162 (8th Cir. 1971), cerL denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); Great W. Food 
Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 478 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953); 
G. Hoffman, supra note 78, at 317. 
A "squeeze" presents a less extreme situation. "[T]here may not be an actual monop-
oly of the cash commodity itself, but for one reason or another deliverable supplies of the 
commodity in the delivery month are low, while the open interest on the futures market is 
considerably in excess of the deliverable supplies." Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 
1154, 1162 (8th Cir. 1971), cerL denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); see Volkart Bros. v. Free-
man, 311 F.2d 52, 59 (5th Cir. 1962). Thus, "if the futures market alone is dominated, 
the trader's action is referred to as a 'squeeze'." Note, supra note 73, at 175-76; see 1 T. 
Russo, supra note 13, at 12-17. 
Federal law specifically prohibits comers. See 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1982). The law is less 
clear with respect to squeezes. Both cases and commentators split as to whether it is 
illegal for a trader to take advantage of a price increase that occurs as a result of a 
shortage of deliverable supply, where the trader owns none of the supply and has done 
nothing to restrict that supply. Compare Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 
(8th Cir. 1971), cerL denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972) (illegal for trader to take advantage of 
shortage, regardless of source of shortage) and David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 
1287 (1971) (same) and Note, supra note 73, at 180-83 (same) with Volkart Bros. v. Free-
man, 311 F.2d 52, 58-59 (5th Cir. 1962) (trader may take advantage of shortage he did 
not create) and T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 310-11 (same) and Bianco, 
supra note 7, at 37 (same) and Hieronymus, Manipulation, supra note 119, at 53-55 
(same). 
An understanding of a comer requires an understanding of the role of delivery in a 
futures contract. Futures contracts typically provide for delivery of a physical commod-
ity as a means of settlement. The delivery requirement is important because it is what 
causes futures prices and cash prices to converge. Convergence occurs because if a wide 
disparity exists, arbitrage becomes profitable and is practiced until the prices come into 
line. For example, if cash prices are substantially lower than futures prices, an arbi-
trageur will buy cash commodities, sell a futures contract and deliver on the contract. 
These transactions themselves will tend to increase cash prices and decrease futures 
prices. Arbitrage will prove profitable as long as a disparity exists, but the arbitrage 
transactions will ultimately tend to force cash and futures prices to converge. See Gar-
bade & Silber, Cash Settlement of Futures Contracts: An Economic Analysis, 3 J. Fut. 
Mkts. 451, 454 (1983). 
Although it is impossible to predict exactly what price parties will agree on, ordinarily, 
it is to be expected that the price at which an offset occurs would be less than the cost of 
delivery for the shorts and greater than the value to the longs of the delivered commodity. 
A shortage of the physical supply available for delivery increases the cost to the short of 
making delivery and renders it likely that the settlement price at which the shorts and the 
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type of manipulation.218 In addition, Judge Easterbrook has proposed a 
third approach, focusing on the presence of fraud or concealment in a 
trader's activities.219 Although this approach offers an interesting alter-
native to the artificial price approach, it too suffers from certain concep-
tual and practical problems. 
longs arrive will be higher than when no shortage exists. See Kyle, A Theory of Futures 
Market Manipulations, in The Industrial Organization of Futures Markets 141, 145-48 
(R. Anderson ed. 1984). Of course, if the shortage reflects a nationwide shortage, then 
the price increase is completely appropriate and expected. See 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, 
at 12-50 (noting that a shortage in the cash market should cause futures prices to rise and 
such a price rise is not artificial). Cash prices everywhere will go up, as will futures 
prices, as should happen when there is a shortage. 
A troublesome situation arises when the shortage of deliverable supply is a local prob-
lem, out of scale with broader conditions. See, e.g., Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 
52, 59-60 (5th Cir. 1962). In such a situation, logic again would dictate that it would be 
in the best interest of both parties to offset, rather than to settle by delivery. It is likely, 
however, that the settlement price will be substantially above both the cash price that 
prevails in other locations and the futures price for nonexpiring contracts. See Kyle, 
supra, at 147. 
218. The CEA prohibits both "manipulation" and "corners," and, thus, the terms 
could be interpreted as referring to distinct phenomena. Nonetheless, corners generally 
have been treated as a subcategory of manipulation. See, e.g., Grain Futures Act Amend-
ment: Hearings before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.. 19 (1928); 
see also 1928 Senate Cotton Hearings, supra note 67, at 203 (most important example of 
manipulation is the "accumulation in a given market of such a quantity of contracts for a 
given month that it is physically impossible to fulfill those contracts by delivery."). 
Although corners have been treated as a type of manipulation, the two terms are not 
synonymous. See Jan. 1921 House Hearings, supra note 65, at 320 (witness indicates that 
there is a difference between corners and manipulation); id. at 683 (can have manipula-
tion without a corner). 
Relatively little discussion of corners is found in the CEA's legislative history. This 
may stem from a general perception that the "old-fashioned" corner had been largely 
eliminated. See Jan. 1921 House Hearings, supra note 65, at 911. Moreover, corners 
generally were thought to raise, rather than lower, prices. See 1921 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 64, at 315. This is significant for two reasons. First, a perception existed that 
the boards of trade worked hard to stop all practices that caused prices to rise. See id. at 
335. Second, and probably more important, during the 1920's and 1930's, congressional 
concern focused on prices being too low, as opposed to their being too high. See, e.g., id. 
at 315; 61 Cong. Rec. 1330 (1921). This preoccupation with low, rather than high, prices 
may explain why selling short, which was thought to depress prices, was considered a far 
greater evil than buying long, which was thought to raise prices. See, e.g., 1934 Grain 
Regulation Hearings, supra note 80, at 25 (discussing whether short selling is illegal or 
violative of the Act); 1932 Short Selling Hearings, supra note 68, at 181-82 (concerning a 
bill that would limit, and in some cases prohibit, short selling but would include no limi-
tations on long transactions); 1931 Senate Cotton & Grain Hearings, supra note 70, at 68-
69 (on a proposed bill to eliminate short selling); 1921 Senate Hearings, supra note 64, at 
205 (discussing manipulation and its effect on depressing prices). Although the CBOT 
argued that upward price manipulation occurs more often than downward manipulation, 
see 1921 Senate Hearings, supra note 64, at 476, Congress seemed more concerned about 
downward manipulation. See Dickson v. Uhlman Grain Co., 288 U.S. 188, 199 n.4 
(1933); S. Res. No.9, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924); 1921 Senate Hearings, supra note 64, 
at 205; Stassen, supra note 66, at 645-46; Virtue, supra note 66, at 693. 
219. See infra notes 256-72 and accompanying text. 
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1. McDermott Approach 
One of the approaches for dealing with comers or squeezes is that pro-
posed by Edward McDermott. 220 McDermott defines a squeeze as "a 
trader's buying or threatening to take delivery of what it has already 
bought or owns."221 McDermott gives the example of a trader who owns 
a large futures position and a large percentage of the deliverable sup-
ply.222 He reasons that the long's purpose in maintaining his position 
could not be to obtain the physical commodity because there are no 
physicals available.223 Therefore, the only reason for maintaining the po-
sition must be to force up the price. This, he argues, violates the com-
mon law contract doctrine that prohibits one party from hindering the 
other's performance. 224 
McDermott's analysis of the doctrine of hindrance is incomplete. The 
doctrine of hindrance is not an absolute principle in contract law; rather, 
it applies only where the court finds that parties implicitly promised not 
to hinder performance.225 As Professor Williston explains: 
[Hindrance is permissible] where the hindrance is due to some action 
of the promisor which under the terms of the contract or the customs 
ofbusiness he was permitted to take. Thus if a party, seeking to secure 
all the merchandise of a certain character which he could, entered into 
a contract for a quantity of the required goods, and subsequently made 
performance of the contract by the seller more difficult by making 
other purchases which increased the scarcity of the available supply, 
his conduct would furnish no excuse for refusal to perform the prior 
contract. 226 
In a footnote, McDermott indirectly but unsatisfactorily addresses this 
point227 in an attempt to distinguish Iron Trade Products Co. v. Wi/koff 
Co. 228 In WilkojJ, the defendant justified its failure to deliver rails that it 
had contracted to sell by arguing that the plaintiff's other purchases of 
rails caused the price of the remaining rails to rise so high that perform-
ance was impossible. 229 The court rejected this defense. 230 McDermott 
argues that Wilkoff is a case of an "unintentional squeeze,"231 but he 
220. See McDermott, supra note 15. 
221. McDermott, supra note 15, at 204. 
222. See id. at 217. 
223. See id. 
224. See McDermott, supra note 15, at 214-15. 
225. See 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 571 (1950); Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts§ 245 (1979); 3 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts§ 677, at 1956 
(1936). 
226. S. Williston, supra note 225, § 677, at 1956. 
227. See McDermott, supra note 15, at 219 n.88. 
228. 272 Pa. 172, 116 A. 150 (1922). Wi//w.ffcited and relied on the excerpt quoted 
from Williston, supra text accompanying note 226. See 272 Pa. at 175, 116 A. at 151. 
229. See 272 Pa. at 174, 116 A. at 150. 
230. See id. at 177, 116 A. at 151. 
231. McDermott, supra note 15, at 220 n.88. 
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never explains what was unintentional about the plaintiff's conduct.232 
The Wilkoff court offers a more straightforward explanation for its rul-
ing: there was no implied promise in the contract "that plaintiff was to 
refrain from purchasing other rails. "233 
McDermott admits that one might argue that the shorts, having con-
tracted to deliver a commodity, should be held to their contract, and if 
they are unable to deliver, should expect to pay a price. 234 McDermott 
rejects this argument, however, and offers several reasons. First, he as-
serts that if a long already owns a large quantity of the same commodity 
he has contracted for, then it is improper to demand delivery because to 
do so is "threatening to take delivery of the same thing twice.'ms The 
characterization of this conduct as taking "delivery of the same thing 
twice" does not explain why it is improper for a long to insist that the 
shorts fulfill their contractual obligations. The fact that the shorts will 
have to pay a price for their inability to perform is hardly shocking-
under ordinary contract law ,236 it is not uncommon for people to extract 
a price from those who do not fulfill their contracts.237 McDermott's 
second response is that standing for delivery to drive the price up is im-
232. In the same footnote in which he addresses Wilkoff, McDermott quotes an illus-
tration from the Restatement of Contracts that likewise seems to undermine his hin-
drance approach. The illustration provides: 
A promises to sell and B to buy 1000 bales of hemp in six months from the date 
of the contract. B is buying hemp heavily from various sources, and in conse-
quence A has difficulty in securing 1000 bales and the market price is largely 
increased. A is not excused from performing the constructive condition of 
tendering the hemp in order to subject B to a duty of immediate performance. 
Restatement of Contracts § 295, illustration 3 (1932). Although McDermott relies on 
the Restatement of Contracts to support his hindrance approach, he never explains why 
this illustration is not inconsistent with his proposal. 
233. 272 Pa. at 175, 116 A. at 151. The court concluded, as McDermott himself notes, 
see McDermott, supra note 15, at 220 n.88, that the parties had not contracted for any 
particular rails. See 272 Pa. at 175, 116 A. at 151. This, of course, is true of all futures 
contracts. A futures contract does not call for the delivery of some particular truck-load 
of the commodity; it calls for delivery of a fungible product of specific grade. 
234. See McDermott, supra note 15, at 218. 
235. Id. 
236. Curiously, having invoked the contract principle of hindrance to impose liability 
on certain traders, McDermott appears to argue that because of differences between the 
cash and futures markets, those same traders cannot rely on ordinary contract law to 
justify their extracting a price from the shorts for their failure to deliver. See McDer-
mott, supra note 15, at 218. 
237. Of course, it may be argued that, because in futures contracts, only a tiny percent-
age of traders actually expect to take delivery, use of a contract analogy in which the 
parties do expect to take delivery is inappropriate. But if the parties do not expect actual 
delivery, one still must ask what it is they do expect. In response to this, it can be argued 
that futures traders have contracted for and expect to receive the physical commodities or 
an amount of money equal to what it would cost to purchase those physical commodities 
at the delivery point on the delivery date. See Hobson, supra note 34, at 1-2. It is this 
principle that permits cash settlement contracts to work. If this is, in fact, what the 
parties have contracted for, it is not at all evident why it is wrong for a trader to refuse to 
settle his contracts until the other side offers a price consistent with this contractual 
understanding. 
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proper because the longs have "exclusive knowledge and power."238 He 
does not explain, however, why the presence of knowledge or power 
makes the conduct improper. 
Although McDermott frames his analysis in terms of hindrance, the 
essence of his analysis may be that he considers the demand created by 
the need to fulfill a futures contract to be illegitimate. 239 McDermott 
never explains why the demand created by the need to fulfill a futures 
contract is illegitimate, while demand created by the need to fulfill all 
other contracts is legitimate.240 In reality, it is the delivery requirement 
that causes the cash and futures prices to converge.241 As a former chair-
man of the CFTC has observed, those who differentiate between "real" 
demand and "technical" demand generated by shorts needing to cover 
their obligation in the market "would appear to deny the economic inter-
relationship between the futures and cash markets."242 
2. Van Smith Approach 
Van Smith offers a second approach.243 He would establish a pre-
sumption that traders who stand for delivery after a particular date are 
guilty of manipulation. 244 The burden would then shift to traders "to 
prove their innocence."245 Not only is this approach incomplete, but it is 
based on the erroneous premise that delivery is an unnecessary element 
of futures trading. 
Van Smith notes that the "conventional argument" for delivery provi-
sions is that they cause cash and futures prices to converge.246 He then 
rejects this conventional explanation and argues that it is not the pres-
ence of a delivery provision that causes cash and futures prices to con-
verge. 247 Instead, he argues, the convergence results from the traders' 
"belief" that "there is no other rational standard by which to measure 
the value of the intangible contract rights."248 Van Smith then concludes 
that because it is this belief that causes the convergence of cash and fu-
tures prices, delivery provisions could be eliminated entirely, and the 
238. See McDermott, supra note 15, at 219. 
239. See id. at 218 n.84. 
240. Cf. H. Emery, supra note 6, at 115 (expectations about future demand and supply 
are expressed in genuine offers to buy and sell goods and thus affect price). 
241. See infra notes 250-52 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 35-
36. 
242. Johnson I, supra note 16, at 749; see 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, at 12-48; see also 
Working, Theory of the Inverse Carrying Charges in Future Markets, in Selected Writings 
of Holbrook Working 7 (A. Pecked. 1977) (noting that cash and futures prices are deter-
mined in a single market and futures prices reflect prices of the actual commodity); 
Working I, supra note 38, at 273 (same). 
243. See Van Smith, supra note 15. 
244. See id. at 1606; see also Note, supra note 73, at 184-85. 
245. Van Smith, supra note 15, at 1606. 
246. See id. at 1603. 
247. See id. 
248. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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only reason they have been retained is because exchanges desire to keep 
prices unstable. 249 
While it is true that cash delivery mechanisms are possible in some 
markets, they are not feasible in all markets. There must exist a "good" 
cash price, that is, a price that is widely known and available, is an accu-
rate indicator of value of the underlying commodity or security, and that 
is not itself easily subject to manipulation. 250 More fundamental, the 
existence of cash delivery systems does not demonstrate that no mecha-
nism is necessary to force the convergence of cash and futures prices. 
Cash settlement forces convergence because the settlement price for fu-
tures is based on actual cash prices.251 One cannot simply eliminate the 
delivery mechanism, put nothing in its place, and expect that futures 
prices will continue to bear some relation to cash prices. 252 
Another problem with Van Smith's approach is that it does not solve 
the problem of defining manipulation. He would shift the burden to the 
trader to prove his innocence, but he does not explain what such proof 
would entaiP53 Apparently, a trader must have had a "good reason" for 
standing for delivery,254 but Van Smith offers no analysis of what would 
constitute such a reason. 255 
249. See id. at 1604. 
250. See Garbade & Silber, supra note 217, at 454-59; Hobson, supra note 34, at 2; 
Martell & Salzman, Cash Settlement for Futures Contracts Based on Common Stock Indi-
ces: An Economic and Legal Perspective, 1 J. Fut. Mkts. 291, 292 (1981) (and sources 
cited therein); Paul, The Role of Cash Settlement in Futures Contract Specification, in 
Futures Markets: Regulatory Issues 302-04 (A. Peck ed. 1985); see also Edwards & Ed-
wards, supra note 119, at 353. It has been noted by others that cash settlement may not 
eliminate manipulation but may simply result in the transfer of the manipulative activities 
into the cash market. See Kyle, supra note 217, at 169; Paul, supra, at 275. 
251. See, e.g., A. Paul, K. Kahl & W. Tomek, Performance of Futures Markets: The 
Case of Potatoes 118-21 (1981); Garbade & Silber, supra note 217, at 455; Hobson, supra 
note 34, at 1-2; Martell & Salzman, supra note 250, at 291-92; Working I, supra note 38, 
at 279. 
252. A study of the pork belly market in the early 1960's by Mark Powers illustrates 
the need for a mechanism to cause the convergence of cash and futures prices throughout 
the delivery month. See Powers, Effects of Contract Provisions on the Success of a Futures 
Contract, 49 J. Farm Econ. 833 (1967). In this study, Professor Powers found that dur-
ing 1961-62, cash and futures prices tended not to converge until the last day of trading. 
He concluded that this occurred because delivery was not allowed until after trading for 
the contract month ceased. See id. at 839. However, in 1963, the exchange changed its 
rules to permit delivery throughout the contract month, and, as a result, prices began to 
converge throughout the delivery period. See id. As this study suggests, little reason 
exists to believe that if delivery at the end of the contract month was eliminated, cash and 
futures price convergence would continue. 
253. Van Smith, supra note 15, at 1606. 
254. "Standing for delivery" is accepted terminology for what a trader does when he 
does not offset his contract and thus demands delivery. 
255. For example, it is unclear whether Van Smith would allow a trader to decline to 
offset because that trader believed there was an impending shortage that would cause the 
price to go higher. Yet, permitting traders to act on these beliefs is the only way that 
more extreme price fluctuations are avoided and the proper relationship between cash 
and futures prices is maintained. 
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3. Judge Easterbrook's Manipulation as Fraud Approach 
In the securities area, illegal manipulation requires an element of fraud 
or deceit. 256 A fully disclosed transaction, therefore, cannot constitute 
manipulation, regardless of its effect on the market.257 Judge Easter-
brook has argued that fraud or concealment forms the essence of futures 
manipulation as well.258 Judge Easterbrook bases his argument on the 
observation that deceit or secrecy about one's position and intentions or-
dinarily constitutes a prerequisite to a successful manipulative scheme.259 
According to Judge Easterbrook, manipulation is "conduct in which the 
profit flows solely from the trader's ability to conceal his position from 
other traders and the trades do not move price more quickly in the direc-
tion that reflects long-run conditions of supply and demand. " 260 
No question exists that fraud and concealment constitute important 
aspects of many, if not all, forms of manipulation. The Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Act/61 like its predecessor, the Commodity Exchange 
Act, 262 specifically prohibits deception in the form of false rumors, 263 
wash sales264 or fictitious transactions.265 Deception can, however, also 
take more subtle forms266 in which the line between deceit and astuteness 
can be quite difficult to draw. 
256. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8 (1985); Santa Fe Indus. v. 
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-77 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 
(1976). A full examination of manipulation in securities markets is beyond the scope of 
this Article. For comparisons between securities and futures markets, see Futures Game, 
supra note 5, at 16-20; Harrington II, supra note 119, at 248 n.50; Wolff, OJmparati~·e 
Federal Regulation of the OJmmodities Exchanges and the National Securities Exchanges, 
38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 223 (1969). 
257. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1985); Poser, Stock Market 
Manipulation and OJrporate OJntrol Transactions, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 671, 720-21 
(1986) (concealment necessary for deceit or fraud). 
258. See Easterbrook, supra note 24, at Sl06. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. at S118. 
261. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 
(1974). 
262. CEA, supra note 12. 
263. 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1982); CEA, supra note 12, § 9. 
264. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(A) (1982); CEA, supra note 12, § 4c(A). "Wash sale" is not 
defined by the Act but is understood to mean "the purchase and sale of the same com-
modity futures contract for the same principal under which both sides of the trade 'wash 
out' each other and, in practical effect, the principal does not gain ownership of any new 
contract." 1 P. Johnson, supra note 43, § 3.94, at 527; see id. § 2.29, at 259-63; 1 T. 
Russo, supra note 13, § 12.98. 
265. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(A) (1982); CEA, supra note 12, § 4c(A). The Act does not define 
the phrase "fictitious sale," but it bas been understood to include "transactions not made 
but reported as having been made." 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, at 12-101. In a criminal 
case, the phrase was held to be unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. La Mantia. 
[1978-80 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1!20,667, at 22,715-17 (N.D. Ill. 
1978). 
266. For example, in David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151 (1971), a trader carefully 
timed his orders to give a false impression of a broad-based and growing interest in a 
commodity. See id. at 1152, 1177-78. 
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One of Judge Easterbrook's own examples demonstrates how difficult 
it can be to distinguish deceit and astuteness. Judge Easterbrook de-
scribes what he calls "position fraud": 
[A] party may simply decline to liquidate his position, so that at the 
very close of trading a formerly small holding becomes large in relation 
to the open contracts. The holder of these contracts then demands or 
tenders delivery (depending on whether he is long or short). Holders 
of opposite positions, surprised by the sudden demand or tender, un-
able either to make or take delivery without incurring large costs, and 
unable to find other parties with whom to close out their positions, 
must pay a premium to negotiate around the demand.267 
The "fraud" in this context consists of a trader's failure to disclose to the 
world that his holdings have become relatively large. Yet to call this 
fraud skirts the central issue. It suggests an obligation to disclose when-
ever other traders might misinterpret or misunderstand one's position or 
intentions. But why should traders have this disclosure obligation? As 
Judge Easterbrook himself acknowledges, secrecy is important to the effi-
cient functioning of the market. 268 Secrecy protects hedgers from having 
to disclose commercially sensitive information about their cash posi-
tions.269 Judge Easterbrook deals with the problem of distinguishing de-
ceit from astuteness by explaining that "[t]he essential distinction is 
between secret strategies necessary to capture the value of new informa-
tion about underlying conditions and secrecy designed to cause prices to 
diverge from those that reflect the underlying conditions."270 
Whatever its value as a theoretical matter, this approach suffers from 
many of the practical problems discussed earlier, including the problems 
of determining "conditions of supply and demand" and defining the 
"long-run."271 Moreover, in attempting to ascertain the motivation for a 
trader's desire for secrecy, many courts likely will find themselves lost in 
a standardless examination of intent, the difficulties of which were illus-
trated earlier.272 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION OF MANIPULATION 
The following Part offers an alternative approach to manipulation. 
The proposed definition, like all definitions of manipulation, necessarily 
reflects a view of the underlying purposes served by the manipulation 
prohibition. Therefore, before setting forth the alternative approach, this 
Part first describes and critiques the purposes underlying other ap-
267. Easterbrook, supra note 24, at S106. 
268. See id. at S118; see also Edwards, supra note 37, at 30 n.17 (increased public 
disclosure of positions may reduce usefulness of markets to large hedges and may reduce 
market liquidity). 
269. See Easterbrook, supra note 24, at S111 n.8. 
270. Id. at Sll8. 
271. It is interesting to note that Judge Easterbrook does not offer his definition of 
manipulation as a legal definition, but as an "economic" one. Id. 
272. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text. 
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proaches to manipulation. It then introduces the proposal and sets forth 
its underlying purposes. 
A. Underlying Purpose of the Manipulation Prohibition 
1. Stabilizing Prices 
Some have suggested that the prohibition on manipulation exists to 
stabilize prices. For example, former CFfC Commissioner Johnson has 
stressed that the aim of the CFfC should be to "maintain orderly futures 
trading."273 Similarly, those who advocate an historical approach to ma-
nipulation seem to accept, at least implicitly, this view of the goal of the 
manipulation prohibition.274 As discussed earlier, while the legislative 
history, particularly during the 1920's, demonstrates concern about the 
instability of prices and expresses the expectation that the prohibition on 
manipulation will have the effect of stabilizing prices, 27~ this result ap-
pears to have been understood as the likely by-product of better function-
ing markets, rather than as an end in itself. 276 The manipulation 
prohibition seems a relatively blunt and ineffective way of insuring price 
stability for other reasons as well. Regulating futures markets while ex-
cluding cash and forward transactions serves as a limited and indirect 
way of stabilizing prices of the underlying commodities. Moreover, the 
anti-manipulation provision serves as an extremely limited way to stabi-
lize even futures prices. If the goal of the prohibition of mailipulation is 
to prevent dramatic changes in futures prices, it would seem to be sim-
pler and more effective to do so directly by adopting rules specifying 
maximum price changes. 277 
Even more fundamental, this view of the goal of the manipulation pro-
hibition is at odds with a basic purpose of a futures market. One of the 
main values of futures markets is that they provide information necessary 
to promote the efficient allocation of resources. 278 If the futures market 
is to serve this function effectively, prices must be permitted to fluctuate 
to reflect actual conditions. If "normal" prices prevail in abnormal 
times, people will make allocation decisions that do not reflect actual 
conditions. 
273. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L 
Rep. (CCH) 1121,796, at 27,292 (CFTC 1982) (Johnson, concurring). 
274. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. 
275. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 212, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1921); 61 Cong. Rec. 1314 
(1921). 
276. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text. 
277. Many exchanges in fact do this by establishing limits on daily price fluctuations. 
See 1 P. Johnson, supra note 43, § 2.20, at 244-45; see also Cox, [1986-87 Transfer 
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 23,786, at 34,066 {CFTC 1987) (m determining 
whether a price change was excessive, it is relevant that futures prices "showed active 
resistance to an increase less than regular limit levels"). 
278. See supra notes 40, 42 and accompanying text. 
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2; Stabilizing the Spread Between Cash and Futures Prices 
Another possible goal of the manipulation prohibition focuses on the 
hedging function served by the futures market. It has been suggested 
that successful hedging requires a stable and predictable relationship be-
tween cash and futures prices, and that the goal of the manipulation pro-
hibition should be to insure this stability.279 
As a goal, this raises several problems. First, the goal appears to be 
based on a simplistic understanding of hedging. As Holbrook Working 
ha8 explained, it is inaccurate and simplistic to view the "perfect hedge" 
as one where the spread between cash and futures prices remains con-
stant and which, therefore, results in no profit or loss. 28° Contrary to the 
assumption of this simplistic view of hedging, Working has explained 
that "[m]ost hedging is done in the expectation of a change in spot-future 
price relations."281 Thus, under the more sophisticated theories of hedg-
ing, it is not at all central to hedging that there be a stable spot-futures 
price spread. 282 
In addition, this view suffers from the same problems associated with 
the goal of price stabilization discussed earlier. 283 The mere fact that 
prices or spreads differ from historical levels does not indicate that those 
prices or spreads are inappropriate to the currently prevailing conditions. 
Throughout the duration of a contract, the spread between cash and fu-
tures prices will vary depending on a variety of factors, including the cost 
of storage, interest and insurance for cash supplies. 284 As the time for 
delivery approaches, the cash and futures prices will tend to converge. 285 
Admittedly, shortages or excesses of deliverable supplies at the delivery 
point can cause a temporary price divergence,286 but the conditions pro-
ducing that divergence may not be the result of wrongdoing. There is 
little reason to think that the risks associated with these end-of-delivery-
month price divergences significantly increase the costs of hedging be-
cause the trader can avoid them easily. As Hieronymus has advised, 
"The defense against this kind of unhappy occurrence is quite simple: 
Stay out of the delivery month. . . . [T]he delivery game is one played 
between the terminal merchants and large scale speculators. "287 
279. See Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 11 21,796, at 27,298-99 (CFTC 1982) (Stone, concurring). 
280. Working II, supra note 42, at 325-26; see T. Hieronymus, Economics supra note 
6, at 150 ("a perfect hedge is one that makes all of the money"); see also supra note 44 
and accompanying text. 
281. Working II, supra note 42, at 325. 
282. See supra note 44. 
283. See supra notes 273-78 and accompanying text. 
284. See T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 147-69. 
285. See id. at 152-54. 
286. See id. at 168-69. 
287. Id. at 169. 
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3. Protecting the Lambs from the Wolves 
A third view envisions the underlying goal of the manipulation prohi-
bition as protecting weak and ignorant traders from other traders who 
might take advantage of them.288 For example, one commentator ex-
presses concern about giving licenses to "the scalpers . . . to fleece the 
lambs."289 Similarly, according to former CFfC Chairman Johnson, 
"Recognizing the duty of shorts while avoiding undue exploitation of 
their plight ... should be the objective of the Act."290 
As with the concern about price stabilization, however, the manipula-
tion prohibition seems an inappropriate tool for implementing this goal. 
Although studies indicate that a high percentage of all speculators lose 
money,291 it appears that the vast majority of these "lambs" lose their 
money, not as a result of manipulation, but as a result of their own lack 
of forecasting skills.292. The problem of weak and ignorant traders 
should be handled directly through the imposition of stricter suitabil-
ity293 and disclosure requirements.294 Once traders have entered the 
market, they should be permitted to seek and demand the prices they 
believe reflect futures values. If futures prices are to reflect accurately 
the expectations of traders, they cannot indicate a value discounted to 
insure that traders on the other side will not lose too much money. 
4. An Alternative View 
This Article advances a definition of manipulation premised on the 
288. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text. 
289. Harrington II, supra note 119, at 268. 
290. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 1!21,796, at 27,292 (CFTC 1982) (Johnson, concurring). 
291. One study estimates that, in any given year, seventy-five percent of all speculators 
lose money. See Futures Game, supra note 5, at 296-97. For a description of other re-
lated studies, see id. at 297-307. 
292. See Futures Game, supra note 5, at 307. There is simply no evidence that manip-
ulation is occurring on such a scale and with such regularity that it could possibly explain 
these loses year after year. 
293. A suitability requirement obligates brokers to make an inquiry into the financial 
situation of prospective customers to determine whether a particular investment vehicle is 
appropriate for that customer. See 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, § 12.38. 
The CFTC considered, but decided against, adopting a suitability requirement. See 43 
Fed. Reg. 31886, 31889 (1978); 42 Fed. Reg. 44742, 44743-45 (1977). It is unclear the 
extent to which a suitability requirement should be treated as implicit in the antifraud 
provision of the commodities laws. In declining to adopt a suitability requirement, the 
CFTC stated that such a rule "would merely have codified principles that are implicit in 
the anti-fraud provisions of the Act and the CFTC's rules." /d. 
Nonetheless, in 1986, the CFTC held that no inherent suitability requirement exists in 
§ 4b, although it left open whether such a requirement could be grounded in some other 
provision. See Phacelli v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., [1986-87 Transfer Binder] 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1!23,250, at 32,674-75 (CFTC 1986). 
294. The CFTC requires that futures trading professionals make specific risk disclo-
sure statements to their customers. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.21 (commodity pool operators); 
id., at§ 4.31 (commodity trading advisors); id., at§ 32.5 (commodity option dealers); id., 
at § 155.3 (futures commission merchant). 
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belief that the proper goal of a manipulation prohibition is to ensure the 
proper functioning of the futures market. In this regard, the author be-
gins with Holbrook Working's definition of "the perfect futures market" 
as "one in which the market price would constitute at all times the best 
estimate that could be made, from currently available information, of 
what the price would be at the delivery date of the futures contracts."295 
A futures market produces a reliable296 price by providing an incentive to 
traders to seek out and analyze accurately all available information. 297 
Such informed trading is essential to the operation of the market and 
should be encouraged. In contrast, traders who seek to profit, not 
through their superior ability to predict future prices, but by their ability 
to alter the market price, do not contribute to the efficient operation of 
the market. Such conduct should be considered illegal. 
In addition to this basic premise, the proposed definition is built on 
several other important principles. First, it recognizes that, while manip-
ulation imposes costs on society, 298 an overinclusive prohibition also im-
poses costs on society. One effective way to stop all manipulation in the 
futures markets would be to stop all futures trading, but that "cure" 
would eliminate all the socially useful aspects of futures markets. The 
prohibition's goal should be to eliminate wasteful and counterproductive 
conduct while encouraging conduct necessary to make the market func-
tion properly. 
Second, this definition recognizes that there exists a very wide range of 
conduct that is likely to have an effect on market prices.299 One cannot, 
however, define manipulation as any and all conduct intended to affect 
price. Virtually all trading can affect price, 300 yet manipulation must in-
295. Working IV, supra note 153, at 446. 
296. The reliability or "correctness" of a futures price depends, not on the correspon-
dence between expectation and actual events, but rather on the "correspondence between 
the actual expectation and what ought to be expected in the light of available informa-
tion." Id. at 447. 
297. See Easterbrook, supra note 24, at S 117. This is not to suggest that the only 
legitimate way to trade is on the basis of information concerning underlying supply and 
demand. There are some traders, known as "chartists" or technical traders, who believe 
future prices can be predicted on the basis of past price patterns. See, e.g., Futures Game, 
supra note 5, at 165-215. Whether one is trading on the basis of sun spots, astrology or 
knowledge of economics, the legitimate trader still is attempting to make predictions 
based on currently available information. 
298. One should not, however, overestimate those costs. A recent study of manipula-
tion found that courts focus on, and are best able to detect, short-term price aberrations 
that typically occur during the last day or two before a contract matures. See Edwards & 
Edwards, supra note 119, at 343. Moreover, these short-term price aberrations are un-
likely to interfere seriously with price discovery. People who rely on futures prices gener-
ally have a planning horizon of more than one or two days and, thus, do not rely on 
prices from the last two days of a trading period. See id. at 346-47. 
299. False rumors are a blatant form of conduct likely (and intended) to have such an 
effect. As noted below, however, virtually all trading is capable of affecting price. See 
infra note 300 and accompanying text. 
300. See Moore & Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 46, 50 (1934). For example, all buy orders reflect a new demand and tend to urge 
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valve something more than trading with the knowledge of this truth. 301 
Third, the proposed definition incorporates the premise that a price 
standing alone is neither proper nor improper. Prices reflect the conclu-
sions reached by traders after weighing the innumerable conditions that 
traders consider relevant to predicting future prices. 302 Those conditions 
may be usual or unusual, created by people or the result of natural disas-
ter. Courts should focus on these conditions, not on the resulting 
price.3o3 
B. Description of the Proposed Definition 
Based on this view of properly functioning futures markets, this Arti-
cle defines manipulation as conduct that would be uneconomical or irra-
tional, absent an effect on market price. 304 This proposed approach to 
manipulation comports with the GFA's understanding of manipula-
tion-the only coherent theory of manipulation that emerges in the legis-
lative history.305 As discussed earlier, under the GFA's approach, 
manipulators "trade largely on the basis of ... their ability ... to bring 
prices upward, while all sell orders represent new supply and tend to urge prices down-
ward. See Belveal, Commodity Speculation with Profits in Mind 93-94 (1967) (quoted in 
David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1195 (1971)). 
301. As the GFA made clear sixty years ago, to engage in a large scale transaction that 
affects price and that the trader must have known would affect price docs not necessarily 
amount to manipulation. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text. 
302. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
303. The CFfC appears to be moving in this direction. The decision of the Commis-
sion in Indiana Farm Bureau focuses much more on how the conditions of shortage arose 
than on whether the price was "artificial." As explained in a footnote, "when a price is 
affected by a factor which is not legitimate, the resulting price is necessarily artificial. 
Thus, the focus should not be as much on the ultimate price, as on the nature of the 
factors causing it." Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1!21,796, at 27,288 n.2 (CFTC 1982) (quoted with approl·al in 
Cox, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1!23,786, at 34,064 (CFTC 
1987)). In addition, the Commission has recognized that traders mtionally and legiti-
mately seek the best prices and that, in fact, the efficient opemtion of the market 
presumes that traders will do just that. See Indiana Farm Bureau, at 27,283. Thus, the 
Commission apparently has rejected a simplistic causation analysis that focuses on the 
price formation stage after all the conditions affecting valuation have occurred. In Cox, 
for example, the Commission held that the delivemble supply must be evaluated not sim-
ply on the last day of trading, but throughout the delivery month. See Cox, at 34,062. 
Unfortunately, the Commission continues to hold that proof of an artificial price is a 
central element of manipulation, see Cox, at 34,061, though it has offered little explication 
of its definition of artificial price. See supra note 147. 
304. In Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 
932 (1972), the appellant argued that an "uneconomic act" constitutes a prerequisite for a 
finding of manipulation. See id. at 1162. The court construed this argument to mean 
that, in order for the scheme to be considered manipulation, the complete manipulative 
scheme must have proved unprofitable. See id. at 1162-63. Having so construed it, the 
court rejected the argument out of hand. See id. at 1163. The Corgi// court, however, 
completely misinterpreted appellant's argument. The appellant asserted, not that the en-
tire manipulative scheme ultimately must have proved unprofitable, but that the alleged 
manipulative acts were economically inexplicable absent a manipulative intent. 
305. See supra notes 78-93 and accompanying text. 
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about temporary market conditions of which they may take advantage to 
make profits."306 
The proposed approach to manipulation also is consistent with an 
analogous antitrust concept-that of predatory practices. The essence of 
predation is that the conduct in question is rational only because of the 
expected future effect that conduct will have on the market or on one's 
competitors. 307 In cases of predatory pricing, for example, a firm sets 
prices below cost because it hopes through these unprofitable transac-
tions to alter the marketplace-for example, to eliminate competition-
in a way that will make future profits possible. 308 As one court has ex-
plained, "[T]he anticipated benefits of defendant's price depended on its 
tendency to discipline or eliminate competition and thereby enhance the 
firm's long-term ability to reap the benefits of monopoly power."309 
Thus, predation, like manipulation, occurs when the profitability of a 
transaction or other conduct depends on the tendency of that transaction 
or conduct to affect the market. 
The basic premise of the proposed approach seems to have been ac-
306. GFA Letter, supra note 80, at 5; see supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text. 
307. Professor Sullivan defines predatory business conduct as "conduct which has the 
purpose and effect of advancing the actor's competitive position, not by improving the 
actor's market performance, but by threatening to injure or injuring actual or potential 
competitors." L. Sullivan, Antitrust 108 (1977). Professors Ordover and Willig offer a 
similar definition: 
[P]redatory objectives are present if a practice would be unprofitable without 
the exit [of a rival] it causes, but profitable with the exit. Thus, although a 
practice may cause a rival's exit, it is predatory only if the practice would not be 
profitable without the additional monopoly power resulting from the exit. 
Ordover & Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 
91 Yale L.J. 8, 9 (1981); see also Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1121, 1124-26 (1983) (criticizing some aspects of the analysis by Ordover and Willig 
but accepting the basic definition of predatory business conduct). 
308. Predatory pricing closely resembles manipulation in at least one respect-both 
concern the unilateral pricing activities of marketplace participants. 
Numerous theories exist with respect to predatory pricing concerning the appropriate 
measure for determining when a price is "below cost." See Bradley & Hay, Predatory 
Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 Cornell 
L. Rev. 738 (1981). Of course, none of this cost-based analysis is relevant to futures 
trading. Nonetheless, the underlying theory of predation may be applied to the unilateral 
pricing activities of futures traders. 
309. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITI Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 
1035-36 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982) (quoted with approval in D.E. 
Rogers Assocs. v. Gardner-Denver Co., 718 F.2d 1431, 1436 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
467 U.S. 1242 (1984)); see Matsushita Electric Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574, 589-92 (1986). Despite the wide range of views on the best method for deciding 
whether a particular price is predatory, there seems to be fairly broad agreement on the 
general dynamic of predation-that is, that the conduct in question is rational or profita-
ble only because of the expected future effect of that conduct on the marketplace. See, 
e.g., R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 144 (1978); III P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust 
Law 151 (1978); F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure & Economic Performance 335 
(2d ed. 1980); Hurwitz & Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends, 
35 Vand. L. Rev. 63, 67-69 (1982). 
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cepted by both the CFfC310 and a leading commentator.311 They agree, 
for example, that to engage in conduct that does "not have a bona fide 
investment or commercial purpose,"312 "[o]ther than the investment or 
commercial purpose of extracting a profit through the creation of an arti-
ficial price"313 constitutes manipulation. They also agree that to stand 
for delivery in order to meet "legitimate commercial commitments,"314 
even if that conduct has a foreseeable price effect, does not amount to 
manipulation. 315 
The proposed approach to manipulation generalizes these basic pro-
positions to avoid the need to determine whether an artificial price exists 
and to avoid any implication that some reasons for desiring a commodity 
are not legitimate, even if those reasons have nothing to do with the price 
impact of one's conduct. For example, a trader might demand delivery 
of silver because he uses silver in certain industrial processes, or uses it to 
make dental fillings or jewelry. This would seem to be a legitimate com-
mercial need. But traders also may possess their own idiosyncratic rea-
sons for desiring some commodity.316 Little basis exists for a court or 
agency to distinguish among these different types of demand. Those who 
want silver in order to construct a palace, or simply because it makes 
them feel good, should receive the same treatment as those who want 
silver for dental fillings, jewelry or industrial processes.317 A strong indi-
cation of manipulation does arise, however, when a trader holding physi-
cal supplies located at a delivery point foregoes the opportunity to sell 
that commodity there and instead ships the commodity away and sells it 
for a lower net price.318 In such a case, the fact that the sale may have 
been made to a legitimate commercial enterprise in no way lessens the 
indications of manipulation. 
To reiterate, the proposed approach would classify as manipulation 
any conduct where the anticipated profitability of that conduct depends 
310. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut L 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 27,286 (CFTC 1982). 
311. 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, § 12.19, at 12-34. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. at 12-34 n.13 (emphasis omitted). 
314. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 27,286 (CFTC 1982) (quoted in 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, 
§ 12.19, at 12-35). 
315. Unlike this author's proposed approach, however, the CFTC and Russo continue 
to treat artificial price as a central element of manipulation. See Indiana Farm Bureau 
Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) r 21,796, at 27,283 
(CFTC 1982); 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, §§ 12.22-12.29. 
316. It has been suggested, for example, that the Hunt brothers sought to own huge 
quantities of silver because they viewed metals as the only real store of value. See H. 
Hurt III, Texas Rich 327 (1981). 
317. Judge Easterbrook has observed that "[i]f people want to purchase wheat to ad-
mire its beauty rather than to mill it into flour, they may be weird, but their demand is 
real." Easterbrook, supra note 24, at S117. 
318. The trader, of course, would have an opportunity to offer an innocent explanation 
for this suspicious behavior. See infra notes 352-55 and accompanying text. 
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on its affecting the price of the commodity traded. While critics might 
argue that this approach unduly focuses on the trader's intent, the CFfC 
has observed that intent has always been "the essence of manipula-
tion."319 What this approach does is to recast the intent inquiry into a 
more workable test that corresponds to the actual intentions and con-
cerns of traders and manipulators. 320 
C. Applying the Proposed Approach 
Although the proposed approach to manipulation turns on intent, ob-
jective indicia of intent do exist. Certain types of conduct are likely to be 
associated with manipulative intent under the proposed definition. A 
guiding principle in identifying such conduct is that rational investors 
ordinarily "try to buy as cheaply as they can and ... sell as high as they 
can."321 Therefore, a trader who buys for more, or sells for less, than 
was necessary to execute the transaction is likely to be acting, not as an 
investor or speculator, but for the purpose of affecting price. This type of 
apparently uneconomic conduct evinces itself in a variety of practices, all 
of which are designed to accentuate the price impact of any trade or 
series of trades. 322 Frequently, traders accomplish this price impact by 
the way in which they place their orders. As noted earlier, all trading 
has some price effect, and this is particularly true with large-scale trad-
ing. 323 Thus, any attempt to purchase a large quantity of a commodity 
will tend to drive up the price. The rational trader, however, ordinarily 
will seek to minimize the price impact of his own trades because this will 
permit him to get the best price. When trades are executed in a manner 
that seems designed to increase the price impact, manipulative intent 
may be indicated. 324 
319. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, [1982-84 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 21,796, at 27,282 (CFTC 1982). 
320. As discussed earlier, when intent is combined with the artificial price approach, 
the resulting intent test focuses on something manipulators have either never thought of 
or to which they are totally indifferent. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text. 
321. David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1197 (1971). 
322. See Opinion of General Counsel of Commission, [1941-47] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 75,214, at 75,471 (1941). 
323. See supra note 300 and accompanying text; see also David G. Henner, 30 Agric. 
Dec. 1151, 1258 n.149 (1971), and sources cited therein; Opinion of General Counsel of 
Commission, [1941-47] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 75,214, at 75,470; S. Rep. No. 792, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1934); G. Hoffman, supra note 78, at 332-38. 
324. See, e.g., Cargill Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1169-70 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); Vincent W. Kosuga, 19 Agric. Dec. 603, 615 (1960); cf. 
Opinion of General Counsel of Commission, [1941-47] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 75,214, 
at 75,471 (discussing securities manipulation); accord Note, supra note 81, at 664. 
The mere fact oflarge-scale purchases alone, however, would not be sufficient to infer a 
manipulative intent. In Hohenberg Bros., [1975-77 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 20,271, at 21,474 (CFTC 1977), the Commission noted that "[t]he Division of 
Enforcement has not contended that maintenance of a large short futures position in and 
of itself constitutes manipulation in violation of the Act." In three other cases, the de-
fendants were found not to have engaged in a manipulation or comer despite their very 
large futures holdings. See Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 60 (5th Cir. 1962); 
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One type of uneconomic conduct that accentuates the price impact of a 
particular trade is "reaching."325 Reaching occurs when the trader 
makes a bid at a price that is substantially higher, (or lower) than the last 
bid or transaction.326 David G. Henner 321 provides a good example. 
There, the defendant, within the last few seconds of the closing period, 
"bought the board" -that is, he simultaneously accepted all of the 
posted offers. 328 Then, at the ringing of the bell announcing the end of 
the closing period, he shouted out a bid for one contract at a price of 
$41.85-fifty-five points higher than the highest offer and 165 points 
higher than the lowest offer he had just bought.329 The price of $41.85 
represented the high price for the day and the maximum to which prices 
were permitted to rise. 330 The AU found that defendant Henner had 
made his reach bid with the primary intent of increasing the price of the 
commodity331 and that this was prohibited manipulation. 332 Henner 
thus engaged in uneconomic conduct because he intentionally paid more 
than necessary. 333 
Because trading in a manner designed to accentuate the price impact 
of a trade does seem uneconomic, one may be left wondering why anyone 
who is not crazy or ignorant would engage in such a practice. Several 
rationales, in fact, exist. One common explanation is that the trader 
hopes his activity will generate new demand and thus create a more 
favorable market in which to dispose of his purchases.334 This is what 
General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220, 231 (7th Cir. 1948); Cox, [1986-87 
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,786, at 34,059-60 (CFTC 1987); cf. 
Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 383 (2d Cir.) (discussing this 
principle in the context of securities), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910, cerL denied, 414 U.S. 
924 (1973); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1934); Opinion of General Counsel of 
Commission, supra, at 75,470-71. 
325. Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1940). 
326. See id.; Note, supra note 81, at 664. Reaching is uneconomic because the trader is 
not seeking to buy as cheaply as he can. See David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1197 
(1971). 
327. 30 Agric. Dec. 1151 (1971). 
328. /d. at 1161. 
329. See id. 
330. See id. 
331. See id. at 1192. 
332. See id. at 1258. A slight variation of price reaching occurs when, rather than 
entering one bid that represents a dramatic change from the earlier bid, the trader enters 
a series of steadily increasing bids or offers. See David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 
1207 n.73 (1971). This gives the impression of a broad-based and continuing interest in 
the commodity and may be even more damaging to the market than a single, large price 
jump. Cf. SEC v. Bennett, 62 F. Supp. 609, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (manipulation of 
securities). 
333. Of course, in some markets where very rapid price fluctuations occur, it is neces-
sary to offer a substantial change in price in order to induce anyone to sell. See T. Hier-
onymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 39. In such a case, although the bid would 
constitute a jump, it would not be uneconomic because it would represent the lowest 
price at which the trader could purchase. 
334. The basic object of reaching is to generate new demand (or supply) so that the 
price will continue to rise (or fall) once the manipulator removes his demand (supply). 
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the defendant in David G. Henner 335 apparently had in mind. He did not 
make his reach bid until the sounding of the closing bell, because it is the 
closing price on which most traders concentrate in deciding how to 
trade. 336 Moreover, he timed his trades for a period in the month so that 
it would appear that a "key reversal" had occurred. 337 Although the 
scheme failed and the price returned the next day to the level it was at 
prior to the jump bid, the trader, nonetheless, was found to have manipu-
lated the market. 338 
Sometimes the manipulator hopes to generate new demand among 
those who do not realize what a good buy the commodity is or even from 
those who get caught up in an irrational, speculative frenzy. Here, the 
object is achieved through something known as "stop-order raiding" or 
"gunning."339 In futures trading, a trader commonly places stop-loss or-
Frequently, either rising prices or increased activity attract new buyers. Thus, by gener-
ating a price surge or flurry of activity, a trader may be able to attract new buyers who 
will keep the price rising long enough to permit him to reap his profit. See Opinion of 
General Counsel of Commission, [1941-47] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 75,214, at 75,470; 
see also Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 332, 336-37 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (discussing how one might lure others into the market by creating a 
" 'price mirage' "). This type of scheme is sometimes referred to as "hulling" the market 
(or "bearing" the market when the trader causes a price decline). See David G. Henner, 
30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1191 (1971); see also Note, supra note 81, at 660 (discussing bull and 
bear pools in securities trading). As one tribunal explained, a hulling scheme includes 
any attempt "to attract a public following or to generate a more favorable market in 
which to dispose of at a profit futures that were bought in [sic] during a preceding period 
when prices were lower." David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1191 (1971) (quoting 
Thomsen, Agricultural Prices 292-93 (1936)). It is important to note that in order for the 
scheme to work, the trader must be able to generate demand on the part of others, be-
cause if the price is supported only by reason of the manipulator's activities, he will not 
be able to get his money out. Once he stops buying, the price will return to its prior level 
and he will have accomplished nothing other than simply to have paid more than anyone 
else for the commodity. See supra note 73. 
335. See 30 Agric. Dec. at 1177. 
336. See id. at 1177. 
337. Id. at 1178. 
338. See id. at 1174. Reuben E. McGuigan, 5 Agric. Dec. 249 (1946), provides an-
other example of a trader attempting to generate new demand. There, the respondent 
advertised himself as being in the business of giving market advice. See id. at 249. He 
would assume market positions and then advise purchases or sales that would favorably 
affect his position. See id. at 250. When the market had moved sufficiently, he would sell 
his positions at a profit. See id.; cf. R.J. Koeppe & Co. v. SEC, 95 F.2d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 
1938) (involving a similar scheme in the securities market). Ordinarily, there is nothing 
uneconomic about a businessman advertising to others the product he is attempting to 
sell. In the context of investments, however, it is somewhat suspect when a trader, hav-
ing told others what a great investment something is and how much money they will 
make on it, then turns around and sells that very investment. As the FI'C has noted: 
"For a speculator to put out market circulars advising the public to buy (or sell) and then 
himself do the contrary is thoroughly dishonest." FI'C Report, supra note 217, at 258 
(1926). 
339. Gunning for stop-loss orders has been referred to as "one of the 'main forms of 
manipulation.' " See David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1181 n.25 ( 1971) (quoting 
Irwin, The Nature of Risk Assumption in the Trading on the Organized Exchanges, 27 
Am. Econ. Rev. 269 (1937)). 
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ders. 340 A stop-loss order is a standing order to the broker to liquidate 
the trader's position should the price reach a particular level in order to 
prevent devastating losses. 341 By increasing the price somewhat, a ma-
nipulator may be able to generate stop-loss purchasing on the part of 
shorts, and this, in turn, will push the price even higher.342 The manipu-
lator may be" able to turn a quick profit by pushing the price up and then 
selling at an even higher price to those with stop-loss orders. 343 
In addition to the desire to generate new demand in order to permit a 
manipulator to sell his newly acquired holdings at a profit, other possible 
explanations exist for apparently uneconomic conduct. Sometimes the 
explanation becomes apparent when the allegedly manipulative transac-
tion is viewed in relation to the other holdings and dealings of the de-
fendant. A classic situation in which this occurs is when something in 
which the trader has a great interest is pegged to the manipulated price. 
For example, in Zenith-Goodley Co. 344 the government pegged its sup-
port price of milk to the price of butter on the New York Mercantile 
Exchange at given times. 345 In order to increase the price of milk, the 
Dairymen's League Cooperative Association concluded it was desirable 
to keep the price of butter above eighty-four cents per pound.346 During 
the critical period, the League made large purchases of butter at eighty-
four cents or higher, and thereby maintained the price. 347 The Coopera-
tive was willing to pay more than the going price for butter because it 
anticipated making a substantial profit in other related transactions. 348 
Uneconomic conduct also can be identified in the typical corner or 
squeeze. For example, a trader might ship supplies away from the deliv-
ery point, selling them at a loss. 349 In the alternative, a trader might 
340. See B. Gould, The Dow Jones-Irwin Guide to Commodities Trading 321, 323-24 
(2d ed. 1981). 
341. Futures trading is a highly leveraged activity. Initial margins are low, but even 
relatively small adverse price changes can result in a trader not only losing his posted 
margin but having to post further margin amounts as well. Stop-loss orders allow traders 
to plan in advance the amount they are willing to risk. See B. Gould, supra note 340, at 
323-24; T. Hieronymus, Economics, supra note 6, at 60; Note, supra note 81, at 674. 
342. See H. Emery, supra note 6, at 122 n.1; Anderson, supra note 145, at 7; Note, 
supra note 81, at 660-61. 
343. See Anderson, supra note 145, at 7. 
344. 6 Agric. Dec. 900 (1947). 
345. See id. at 903. The pegged and the manipulated commodities need not be differ-
ent. For example, in Howard Randolph, 21 Agric. Dec. 219 (1962), the trader had made 
a contract to deliver eggs with the price he would receive to be based on the spot price of 
eggs on the day of delivery. See id. at 222. On the day of delivery, the trader placed an 
order on the spot market causing the price to rise to the desired level. See id. 
346. 6 Agric. Dec. at 905. 
347. Id. at 904. 
348. In a similar vein, the Opinion of General Counsel of Commission states that one 
relevant circumstance in the case of suspected manipulation is "whether [the trader] was 
being pressed to repay or reduce bank loans for which securities of the same issues were 
held as collateral." [1941-47] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 75,214, at 75,471. 
349. See Landon V. Butler, 14 Agric. Dec. 429, 433 (1955); see also Vincent W. 
Kosuga, 19 Agric. Dec. 603, 616 (1960) (respondent made agreements with growers and 
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make delivery difficult by tying up the necessary transportation. Traders 
allegedly used this latter technique in a potato manipulation scheme. 350 
There, the defendants reportedly tied up the trains using phony export 
shipments and left the boxcars loaded or only partially unloaded. 3S1 In 
both of these situations, the trader has engaged in conduct falling within 
the proposed definition of manipulation-the profitability of the conduct 
depends on its tendency to reduce supply and affect the price. Shipping 
supplies at a loss or leaving rail cars to sit without being unloaded ordi-
narily would be unprofitable unless one hoped and expected that the con-
duct would have a price effect. Hence, unless the defendant can 
demonstrate a nonmanipulative purpose, such conduct clearly would be 
illegal. 
The above scenarios describe conduct that appears uneconomic absent 
a manipulative intent. Proof of such conduct should be sufficient to es-
tablish a prima facie case of manipulation. After a prima facie case is 
established, the burden then would shift to the defendant to articulate a 
legitimate, nonmanipulative reason for the conduct. 352 The reason for 
shifting the burden to the defendant is that, in the face of such suspicious 
conduct, the defendant stands in the best position to come forward with 
evidence to explain his own conduct. It is important to emphasize, how-
ever, that under this approach, when the burden of proof shifts, the de-
fendant is expected to come forward, not with proof that the price is 
"normal," but with proof that his conduct was economically rational 
even absent an effect on price. 
A variety of possible legitimate explanations exist for ordinarily suspi-
cious conduct. The trader may have had unusual obligations or needs. 353 
Likewise, unusual market conditions may have caused the unusual trad-
shippers of onions to keep onions from being used for deliveries on the exchange); FfC 
Report, supra note 217, at 251 (1926) (alleged cornerer sold his pork in the local market, 
but first cut it to make it unsuitable for delivery on futures contracts). 
350. See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 290 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). 
351. See id. 
352. In General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1948), the govern-
ment argued that the defendants tried to change one of the rules of the Exchange in order 
to assist in a manipulative scheme. See id. at 228-29. When the defendants attempted to 
justify their conduct on the ground that the rule that they had tried to change was unfair, 
the government replied that the "merits" of the rule change were irrelevant. /d. at 229. 
The court, however, accepted evidence concerning the merits of the proposed change, 
noting that such evidence "affords a sound basis for the argument by ... [the defendants] 
that they were motivated by a legitimate rather than an ulterior purpose." /d.; see also 
Vincent W. Kosuga, 19 Agric. Dec. 603, 615-16 (1960) (dismissing one count of manipu-
lation charge because defendant's explanation of his conduct raised a sufficient question 
about the presence of manipulative intent). 
353. For example in David G. Henner, Henner contended that he very much wanted to 
purchase one more contract and he had to "reach" because he thought it would be neces-
sary in order to insure that someone would accept the bid. 30 Agric. Dec. I I 51, 1184-85 
(1971). While under some circumstances the explanation might have been plausible, the 
judicial officer found that other conduct by the defendant in this case was completely 
inconsistent with his explanation. See id. at 1187-88. 
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ing conduct. For example, bids that might otherwise appear to be jump 
bids may be necessary in a rapidly changing market. 354 Last, the uneco-
nomic trading simply may reflect bad judgment. Sometimes traders 
make bad decisions, and there is nothing illegal about simply having been 
wrong.Jss 
Even under this proposed approach, ambiguous cases and close calls, 
of course, will still arise. Sometimes, a defendant's motives may be 
mixed and complex. In handling such situations, the proper course of 
action is that which is articulated by Thomas Russo: "[D]oubts concern-
ing the legitimacy of the conduct should generally be resolved in favor of 
permitting the behavior. Where conduct is in furtherance of a legitimate 
business purpose . . . the best course is to let the market be the final 
arbiter."356 
CONCLUSION 
Congress, courts, and commentators have condemned manipulation 
for over 65 years. Despite this long history, manipulation never has been 
adequately defined. The traditional focus on whether the resulting price 
is "artificial" not only has made the offense of manipulation vague, but 
also has required courts to engage in an extremely complex economic 
analysis that they are ill-equipped to perform. The approach proposed in 
this Article, instead of focusing on the resulting price, focuses on the 
conditions of shortage or surplus that the price reflects. The basic issue is 
whether the accused manipulator created those conditions. Specifically, 
this Article defines manipulation as conduct that would be uneconomical 
or irrational, absent an effect on the market price. This approach is in-
tended to promote, in both usual and unusual times, the process of price 
discovery and to strike a balance between over-deterrence and under-
deterrence. 
The proposed approach does not attempt to sweep all problems of the 
futures markets into the manipulation prohibition. 357 In the author's 
354. In analyzing a defense along these lines, it is necessary to consider the nature of 
the information available to the market at the time of the trades, as well as the pattern of 
trading prior to the bid in question. Expert opinion, or the lack of it, may prove particu-
larly helpful and persuasive on this point. See General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 
220, 227 (7th Cir. 1948); David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1151, 1191, 1213-15 (1971). 
355. See Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. at 1252. In assessing such a defense, however, it 
certainly would be appropriate to consider the trader's experience and whether the trades 
in question were unusual for that trader. Thus, in David G. Henner, the fact that Henner 
was an experienced and successful trader strongly influenced the judge. See id. at 1260. 
The experts had characterized the bid in question as" 'atrocious,'" id. at 1191, and the 
fact of Henner's experience made his claim of mere bad judgment implausible. In addi-
tion, the judicial officer found it very unusual for Henner to make bids at all. Ordinarily, 
he operated simply by accepting offers made by others. See id. at 1187. All of these 
factors combined to lead the officer to the conclusion that the defendant's conduct was 
not simply a bad decision, but a deliberate attempt to increase prices. See id. at 1192. 
356. 1 T. Russo, supra note 13, § 12.01, at 12-6. 
357. The examples used in this Article have focused on manipulation in the context of 
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view, it is a mistake to use that prohibition as a catch-all for all the per-
ceived inadequacies of the marketplace. 358 If discrete problems remain, 
they should be dealt with directly rather than by turning manipulation 
into a vague and open-ended concept. Surely the time has come to adopt 
a definition of manipulation that will be relatively easy to apply and will 
advance the goal of an efficiently operating futures market. 
traditional commodity futures requiring physical delivery. The Article does not directly 
address financial and stock index futures that use a cash delivery system. The approach 
suggested here, however, is not dependent on the existence of a physical delivery system. 
Reaching, see supra notes 325-38 and accompanying text, stop-order raiding, see supra 
notes 339-43 and accompanying text, and the type of purchasing undertaken in Zenith-
Goodley Co., 6 Agric. Dec. 900 (1947), see supra notes 344-48 and accompanying text, all 
are types of manipulation that are covered by this Article's analysis and that could be 
undertaken in a market that involved a cash delivery system. It is, of course, possible 
that further analysis focused specifically on financial and stock index futures would iden-
tify problems unique to those markets that would warrant a different approach to manip-
ulation in those markets. As in more traditional futures markets, however, the author 
would caution against using the manipulation prohibition as a catchall device for cor-
recting all perceived problems in these markets. It may well be that the unique problems 
that exist in these markets are better addressed directly, rather than indirectly. For a 
general discussion of financial futures, seeM. Powers & D. Vogel, Inside the Financial 
Futures Markets (1981), and for a general discussion of stock index futures, see Mark-
ham & Gilberg, supra note 32. 
358. For a discussion of some of the problems that others have attempted to pull 
within the manipulation prohibition, see supra notes 273-94 and accompanying text. 
